Dutiful Daughters: an exploration of kinship politics through Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori by O'Bryan, Maureen
 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Thesis: Dutiful Daughter: an exploration of kinship politics through 
 Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori 
  
 Maureen Makiko O’Bryan 
 Bachelor of Arts, International Studies, 2019 
  
Thesis Advisor: Professor Youngju Ryu, Ph.D. 
 
 
Around the world, women who attain positions of political power are more likely to come from 
political families than their male counterparts. Park Geun-hye in South Korea and Keiko 
Fujimori in Peru are two recent examples of this trend and both cases highlight the intersection 
of kinship, gender, and memory. What is the effect of kinship and memory on political 
campaigns? By analyzing the campaign videos of Fujimori and Park from their presidential runs, 
this thesis argues that kinship ties allowed Park and Keiko to attain political popularity, while 
walking the thin line of their authoritarian fathers’ fraught legacies. Park was able to capitalize 
on the nostalgia for her father more effectively because his memory is equated with a sense of 
economic progress and she ran during a period of slow economic growth. Although Keiko relied 
less on memory, she mimicked her father’s campaign strategy and appealed to a similar base, but 
was ultimately held back by his ongoing criminal proceedings.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction  
 Indira Gandhi made history in 1966 when she was elected the first, and to date only, 
female prime minister of India. As the only daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime 
minister, she was destined for politics.1 20 years later the Philippines elected their first female 
president, Corazon Aquino. A self-proclaimed “plain housewife,” she was the wife of Senator 
Aquino, who was an assassinated opposition leader.2 Both women are hailed as leading females 
in political history, but how did they rise to the top and what are their legacies? Indira Gandhi 
worked her way up from assisting her father when he was prime minister in unofficial roles, to 
being President of the National Congress, to serving as a member of cabinet. Her terms as prime 
minister were marred by the legacy of her state of emergency, by nepotism and by an 
unprecedented centralization of power.3 Corazon Aquino had no political experience prior to her 
presidency, but came from a powerful family and became the face of the opposition movement 
against dictator Ferdinand Marcos after the death of her husband, a prominent senator. Despite 
her mostly positive legacy as the leader who restored democracy to the Philippines, Aquino was 
also known for appointing many of her family members to political positions.4 What do Aquino 
and Gandhi have in common? Being a female head of state, coming from political families, and 
engaging in corruption or nepotism.  
                                               
1 “Indira Gandhi.” History, A&E Television Networks, (9 Nov. 2009). 
2 Dick Lugar. “The Housewife Who Changed the World.” Huffington Post (25 May 2011). 
3 Ibid. 1 
4 “Aquino Makes 'People Power' Policy All Relative.” Chicago Tribune (16 Mar. 1987). 
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 These characteristics may be simplistic similarities, but nonetheless parallels can be 
drawn. The careers and legacies of Indira Gandhi5 and Corazon Aquino6 have been previously 
discussed, and several other examples exist around the world of women who served, or came 
close to serving, as head of state after having a father or husband serve in that same position.7 
One of the most recent examples of this trend is Park Geun-hye, who was elected president of 
South Korea in 2013. She was the daughter of Park Chung-hee, who was also the President from 
1963 to 1979, serving five consecutive terms after he seized power in 1961 in a military coup. 
Another less successful example is Keiko Fujimori, who ran for president of Peru in 2011 and 
2016. Her father was Alberto Fujimori, who was elected president democratically in 1990 and 
served until 2000. Both fathers had fraught legacies, which their daughters had to address in their 
own presidential campaigns.   
 Given that women experience low rates of participation in the highest levels of politics 
worldwide,8 studying examples of women who do or did serve in powerful positions and their 
careers provides insight on the relationship between gender and politics. When kinship is 
involved, evidence of nepotism and other forms of corruption could have negative implications 
on the political system. Corruption can undermine the authority of the state and citizens’ trust in 
the government, as well as erode social capital and hinder economic development.9 Women in 
                                               
5 Crossette (2008); Dommermuth-Costa (2001); Frank (2002); Malik (1987); Somervill (2007). 
6 Haskins (1988); Komisar (1987); Lugar (2011); Reid (1995); Roces (1998); Zenon (2013). 
7 Benazir Bhutto was the first female prime minister of Pakistan. Her father previously served as both prime minister 
and president of the country. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the 14th president of the Phillipines, is the daughter of the 
9th president. Megawai Sukarnoputri was the first female president of Indonesia and is the daughter of the first 
president of the country. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was elected president of Argentina directly after her 
husband’s term as president. These women are just a few examples of high-ranking female politicians who come 
from political families. There are many other cases that could be mentioned, especially about women who serve in 
other positions such as as mayors, governors, and members of the legislature. 
8 Pamela Paxton and Sheri Kunovich. “Women's Political Representation: The Importance of Ideology.” Social 
Forces, vol. 82, no. 1 (Sept. 2003), pp. 87–113. 
9 Eun Gee Yun. “A Comparative Analysis of Corruption in Canada and South Korea: Focusing the Effect of 
Corruption on Societal Development and Social Capital.” Korea Observer, vol. 44, no. 1 (2013), pp. 143–165. 
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power, especially in Latin America and other non-western countries, are more likely to belong to 
political families than their male counterparts. In a study conducted by Meg Rincker and Farida 
Jalalzai 29% of female political executives, versus just over 10% of male executives, had family 
ties. Their link to power was usually a father or husband.10 How did these women utilize kinship 
in their campaigns? What are the implications of kinship politics? What makes people nostalgic 
for a previous leader, especially an authoritarian one?  
Analyzing the case studies of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori might not answer these 
questions universally, but by adding their stories to the existing scholarship of women like Indira 
Gandhi and Corazon Aquino, I can better understand the relationship between these phenomena. 
I chose the case studies of Park and Keiko in part because they are particularly relevant examples 
due to their fathers’ legacies, but also because of similarities in their political careers.11 Adding 
more recent examples of female kin in politics is also important because of the way candidates 
campaign change and become more accessible through the use of online platforms and mass 
media. Campaigns reach a greater audience with tools such as television ads and videos, which 
allow candidates to convey their message more easily.12  
 In this chapter I introduce my research question and answer, as well as the importance of 
studying female leaders and kinship politics. The chapter then discusses some of the existing 
literature on gender, kinship, and memory politics, which provides a foundation on which to 
review the campaign strategies of Park and Keiko. The methodology explains how and why I 
analyze the campaign videos, and how those videos fit into the legacies of the candidates’ fathers 
                                               
10 Meg Rincker & Farida Jalalzai. “Blood Is Thicker than Water: Family Ties to Political Power Worldwide.” 
Historical Social Research (2018). 
11 See figure 1 for basic similarities and differences between the two case studies.  
12 Diana Owen. “New Media and Political Campaigns.” The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication (Aug 
2017). 
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and public opinion on all four leaders. I then provide a roadmap for the next four chapters of this 
thesis.  
 
1.1 Research Question 
 What is the effect of kinship and memory on political campaigns? I use the case studies 
of Park Geun-hye of South Korea and Keiko Fujimori of Peru to answer this question. Park is a 
more high-profile case considering her impeachment in 2016 and the large-scale democratic 
protests that preceded it. Although Keiko lost both her presidential elections, her case study as a 
congresswoman, party leader, and daughter of an authoritarian president still helps answer 
questions of kinship, gender, and memory in politics.  
I conclude that kinship ties, regardless of how negative aspects of their fathers’ legacies 
were, allowed these women to have political careers and gave them an advantage in their 
presidential campaigns. Although Keiko ultimately lost her elections, I do not characterize her as 
a failed candidate and Park as a successful one, because Keiko has enjoyed political popularity as 
a congresswomen and party leader. In addition to initial name recognition, both daughters used 
techniques to harken back to their fathers’ accomplishments in their campaign. Many people in 
the older generations in Peru and South Korea who supported the fathers were also more likely to 
support their kin. The campaigns differ though, because Park was able to capitalize on nostalgia 
for her assassinated father. 
 Both Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye were popular in part because of their fathers’ 
legacies and the associated memory, but nostalgia for Park Chung-hee is stronger. His daughter 
was able to capitalize on this during the 1997 Asian Financial and 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 
when South Korea once again yearned for a sense of economic stability and progress. Due to 
 5 
Park Chung-hee’s assassination in 1979, he was also never formally implicated of corruption by 
a court of law. Alberto Fujimori, however, is imprisoned for multiple human rights abuses and 
abuse of power, and his daughter had for answer to the scandals of her father during her own 
campaign. Figure 1 features surface level similarities and differences between the two case 
studies to provide a foundation for my analysis. 
 
Fig 1.1: Venn diagram of similarities and differences between Park Geun-hye and Keiko 
Fujimori. 
 
1.2 Literature Review  
1.2.1 Kinship and Gender Politics 
In order to discuss the careers and campaigns of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori, one 
must first understand different values of kinship and gender. Using the example of post war 
Philippines, Mina Roces states that politics is a gendered field rather than a male-dominated 
 6 
field.13 Men occupy official seats of power while women exercise unofficial power through their 
kinship and marriage ties to male politicians. Through these unofficial roles, such as launching 
civic work projects and doing community service, women may develop into officially elected 
and appointed politicians themselves. Looking to Latin America, Magda Hinojosa states that 
when the process of selecting a candidate in politics is more exclusive it benefits women.14 When 
processes are exclusive, the power is in the hands of a few political elites and this allows women 
to avoid self-nomination, which has been shown to be an obstacle for women to rise up the ranks 
in many different fields.15 Studies in the United States have found that women are less likely to 
ask for raises and promotions and are less likely to negotiate than their male counterparts.16  
Modern values in the western democratic context challenge kinship politics and view the 
unofficial political power mentioned above as “unsavory.”17 Although processes which are 
inclusive are characteristics of democracies, they sometimes magnify obstacles and have the 
unanticipated and unintended effect of suppressing female candidacies.18 These modern and 
democratic values, however, are those championed by western-centric scholarship, which also 
stresses loyalty to the nation-state above that of the family.19 Returning to Roces’s scholarship, 
Filipino politicians use the rhetoric of loyalty to the nation-state to criticize others for corruption 
and use this rhetoric to create an image of  being “modern” by western standards. Their behavior 
once elected, however, suggests an ambivalent engagement with modernity. Kinship politics and 
                                               
13 Mina Roces. “Women, Power, and Kinship Politics: Female Power in Post-War Philippines.” Greenwood 
Publishing Group, Inc. (1998). 
14 Magda Hinojosa. Selecting Women, Electing Women: Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin 
America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press (2012). 
15 Ibid. 13 
16 Linda Babcock, et al. “Nice Girls Don’t Ask.” Harvard Business Review (Oct. 2003). 
17 Ibid. 12, pg.17 
18 Ibid. 13 
19 Ibid. 12 
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western values are merely idioms used in the dynamics of politics and social action.20 The female 
presidents of the Philippines, Corazon Aquino and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, accused former 
ruling parties of corruption prior to their presidential runs only to also be implicated in scandals 
that their kin were a part of. 21 Park and Keiko also ran on platforms of eradicating corruption 
and benefited from the scandals of former governments.  
The literature also suggests that a woman who came into power with the help of kinship 
politics is not automatically unqualified for politics. Women can gain experience in unofficial 
and local roles.22 While they can certainly benefit from the name recognition and their kinship 
ties may make them seem more trustworthy,23 both Fujimori and Park served in unelected roles 
as First Lady, as well as in elected roles as congresswomen and party leader, before running for 
president. 
This thesis further explores how gender and kinship ties can influence politics and how 
they manifest in the careers of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori. An analysis of kinship and 
gender will allow for a more in-depth comparison of Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye’s 
political careers. More specifically, understanding how the candidates used these values in their 
presidential campaigns will help me understand what strategies the women used, and how much 
they relied on using their kin ties versus proposing real policy. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20 Ibid. 12 
21 Ibid. 12 
22 Ibid. 12 
23 Ibid. 13 
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1.2.2 Memory Politics 
Much of the literature on memory politics discusses memory in the context of how 
countries remember wars and genocide through memorials and reparations movements.24 This 
thesis aims to recontextualize these concepts of memory in relation to political campaigns and 
the relationship between kinship and memory. More specifically, this thesis will explore the 
nuances between simply being the kin of a previous politician and being nostalgic for that 
politician. The literature does not share one dominant application of or way to discuss nostalgia 
in politics. Several scholars discuss nostalgia in United States politics, and how campaigns of 
politicians such as President Donald Trump have capitalized on nostalgic yearning for a return to 
a “simpler and more secure past that imaginatively preceded losses of jobs, futures, homes, and 
identities.”25 Using the slogan “Make America Great Again,” President Trump is able to 
capitalize on the nostalgia of rural America for an era perceived to be lost by years of harsh 
regulation and globalization. Particularly in his campaign in the coal mining communities of 
America, he uses phrases such as “coal keeps the lights on” to harken back to a golden age of 
coal, which never existed, according to Kimberly Smith. The height of the coal mining industry 
was characterized by black lung disease, poor worker safety and job security, and monopolistic 
company towns.26 This lost ideal America is a memory simultaneously characterized by respect 
for the past, a feeling of loss in the present, and a hopeful longing to recover this ideal future. 
                                               
24 Ellie Hamrick and Haley Duschinski. “Enduring Injustice: Memory Politics and Namibia’s Genocide Reparations 
Movement.” Memory Studies, vol. 11, no. 4 (Oct. 2018) 437–454; David A. Messenger. “Memory Politics and 
Memorial Democràtic in Catalonia.” Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (Apr. 
2016), 175–182. 
25 Stacey L. Novack. "The Politics of Nostalgia: Perils and Untapped Potentials. "Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society, 
vol. 22, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1; Price, Bryan D. "Material Memory: The Politics of Nostalgia on the Eve 
of MAGA." American Studies, vol. 57 no. 1 (2018), pp. 103-115; Walley, Christine J. “Transmedia as Experimental 
Ethnography: The Exit Zero Project, Deindustrialization, and the Politics of Nostalgia.” Journal of the American 
Ethnological Society, vol. 42, no. 4, 25 Oct. 2016, pp. 624–639. 
26 Will Kurlinkus and Krista Kurlinkus. "Coal Keeps the Lights on": Rhetorics of Nostalgia for and in Appalachia." 
College English, vol. 81, no. 2, 2018, pp. 87-109. 
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Cultural theorist Svetlana Boym calls this yearning to restore the past and minimize the negative 
aspects of this carefully selected past "restorative nostalgia," a type of longing that thinks of 
itself as "truth and tradition".27  
Suk Koo Rhee analyzes nostalgia politics as the use of movies and mass media to 
refigure and aesthetically exploit the narratives of Korean Chinese migrants.28 Wen-chin Ouyang 
researches how Arabic novels have created a politics of nostalgia which contribute to discourse 
on aesthetics, ethics and politics that are relevant to cultural transformations of the Arabic 
speaking world.29 
When does an event or a person become memory or nostalgia within a state and when 
does nostalgia emerge for that memory? This distinction is especially important for the case 
study of Keiko Fujimori, whose father is still alive and present in the country’s political 
landscape. What is considered the “past” is critical in defining nostalgia. The Oxford English 
Dictionary describes nostalgia as sentimental longing for a period of the past, especially one in 
an individual's own lifetime.30 This definition will now be applied to a political context, 
specifically in elections. Nostalgia, because it is associated with the past, may be interpreted as a 
conservative concept in antithesis to radicalism and the left.31 Nostalgia could have played a 
greater role in the campaigns of Park and Keiko because they are both conservative candidates 
catering to conservative voters. 
                                               
27 Svetlana Boym. The Future of Nostalgia. Basic Books (2001), p. 13.  
28 Suk K. Rhee. "Uncanny Hybridity and Nostalgia Politics in the Yellow Sea." The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 
76, no. 3 (2017), pp. 729-750. 
29 Wen-chin Ouyang. “Politics of Nostalgia in the Arabic Novel: Nation-State, Modernity and Tradition.” Edinburgh 
University Press (2013). 
30 “nostalgia.” Merriam-Webster.com (2019).  
31 Alastair Bonnett. Left in the Past: Radicalism and the Politics of Nostalgia. Bloomsbury Academic & 
Professional (2010). 
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How memory is created or memorialized is important for a state transitioning into 
democracy because it defines the previous authoritarian regime and how citizens remember it. 
The literature references several different modes through which a state creates memory, 
including education, memorials, days of commemoration, official apologies, rehabilitation, and 
reparations.32 Manning states that confronting memory is a process that societies must undergo to 
properly progress socially and amend the trauma of the past.33 These processes are often created 
by state governments. In these governments, though, there may be actors who use memory as a 
tool to reproduce history and strengthen a political order in states undergoing transition.34 Ko 
examines a new textbook written in 2016 by Park Geun-hye’s administration that neglects some 
of the human rights abuses committed by her father, pointing to how her political motivations to 
positively shape her father’s legacy may have impacted the text. 35 The voluntary omission of 
critical atrocities in Korea’s human rights history shapes how the memories of the younger 
generations are created. Ko states that this case reveals how memory initiatives and truth-seeking 
are constrained by competing political interests in Korea and highlights the difficulties of 
achieving a collective historical account of past abuses in line with the findings of the truth 
commissions.36   
This notion of nostalgia as a conservative concept applies to the Parks and Fujimori as 
right-wing political families. In the Park case study, many of the older generation in South Korea 
                                               
32 Elizabeth A. Cole. “Transitional Justice and the Reform of History Education.” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2007) 115–137; Ñustra Carranza Ko. “South Korea’s Collective Memory 
of Past Human Rights Abuses.” Memory Studies (2018); Peter Manning. Transitional Justice and Memory in 
Cambodia. London: Routledge (2017).  
33 Peter Manning. Transitional Justice and Memory in Cambodia. London: Routledge (2017).  
34 Ñustra Carranza Ko. “South Korea’s Collective Memory of Past Human Rights Abuses.” Memory Studies (2018).  
35 Ibid. 34 
36 Ibid. 34 
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fondly remember Park Chung-hee.37 The scholarship acknowledges that nostalgia played a large 
role in Park Geun-hye’s election.38 Although deceased for over three decades, public opinion 
polls in South Korea figured Park Chung-hee as the most favored and most well performing past 
president from the time of his assassination until 2012,39 with other national surveys revealing 
that citizens would re-elect him if they could.40 What may have been at first a negative memory 
turned into nostalgia for the country’s revolutionary leader that rebuilt their economy. The 
literature also explains what Park Geun-hye’s narrative about her father was as she campaigned 
for president. In her autobiography, Park states that she entered into politics to set the record 
straight about her father and describes him as a “romantic” husband and father.41 She further 
echoes this desire to clarify negative ideas about her father during her campaign in speeches and 
interviews as well.42 Park never, though, explicitly apologizes for her father’s authoritarian 
actions, at risk of distancing voters more sympathetic to her and her family.43  
Although the literature draws from several different sources in analyzing Park’s 
campaign strategy in 2012, this thesis provides an in-depth examination of her four campaign 
videos and adds to the literature a detailed analysis of how Park utilized nostalgia to win the 
presidential election. This thesis then compares Park’s campaign to that of Keiko Fujimori of 
                                               
37 Woojin Kang. “Democratic Performance and Park Chung-Hee Nostalgia in Korean Democracy.” Asian 
Perspective, vol. 40 (2016) 51–78. 
38 Jamie Doucette. “The Occult of Personality: Korea's Candlelight Protests and the Impeachment of Park Geun-
Hye.” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 76, no. 4 (2017) 851–860; Ibid. 18; Young-Im Lee. “From First Daughter 
to First Lady to First Woman President: Park Geun-Hye’s Path to the South Korean Presidency.” Feminist Media 
Studies 17.3 (2017) 377–391; Yeon-Cheol Seong. “The origins and style of Park Geun-Hye.” The Hankyoreh (6 
Dec. 2012). 
39 Jae-Geun Ahn 2013; Jae-Hoon Lim 2012; Bong-Seok Sohn 2011 as cited in Lee, 2017 
40 Ibid. 37 
41 Geun-hye Park. The Exercise of My Despair (2013).  
42 Jamie Doucette. “The Occult of Personality: Korea's Candlelight Protests and the Impeachment of Park Geun-
Hye.” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 76, no. 4 (2017) 851–860 
43 Yeon-Cheol Seong. “The origins and style of Park Geun-Hye.” The Hankyoreh (6 Dec. 2012). 
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Peru and discusses how differences in their strategies indicate how much kinship politics helped 
their campaigns. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
The main primary sources I analyze for evidence of kinship and memory politics are the 
campaign videos of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori, as well as election results and polling 
data from those elections. Campaign videos and polling data offer two sides of the same coin. 
The videos show what the candidates hope to tell the electorate about themselves and what kind 
of president they would be. The polling data shows what the electorate actually thinks of the 
candidate and the campaign. Through visual media a candidate can convey a message (e.g. I will 
be a president similar to my father) without having to verbally say it and is, to an extent, up to 
interpretation by the viewer. If a viewer is a supporter of a candidate’s father, he or she might 
draw more parallels between the father and daughter, whereas a viewer who might not know as 
much about the father figure or is not a supporter of the father might not see those parallels and 
think of the daughter as her own candidate. Polling data offers quantitative evidence as to how 
popular a candidate is and for what reasons. If a poll shows that a candidate is popular because 
the electorate perceives them as someone who will strengthen the economy (without them having 
a particular platform), and revitalizing the economy was something their father was well-liked 
for, then the candidate’s popularity can at least in part be contributed to kinship. Together, the 
campaign videos and public opinion help answer the question of how Park Geun-hye and Keiko 
Fujimori used kinship and memory in their campaigns, how much they relied on those tactics, 
and how effective their campaigns were.  
 13 
Travis Rideout and Michael Fraz found that campaign videos do matter in elections, 
particularly within the American political system, but their impact is contingent on the 
characteristics of the video and who the viewer is. These characteristics include whether the 
video is a positive or negative ad, a promotional versus attack ad, and the emotional appeal of the 
ad, among other things.44 The different types of videos make the impact difficult to measure, 
however, and I cannot exactly determine how effective the candidates’ videos were and how 
many votes they may have moved. Rideout and Franz also stated that the emotional appeal 
present in the campaign ad and its tone are important to how persuasive the video is.45 In 
analyzing political campaign videos of the 2015 general election in Nigeria, Gbadegesin and 
Onanuga found that campaign videos were particularly persuasive because they utilize different 
modes of communication and convey a message despite any language or educational barriers the 
viewer may have.46 Although Korean is the only national language of South Korea, Peru is 
officially a multilingual country and recognizes at least 15 different ethnolinguistic groups other 
than Spanish.47 The literacy rates are also lower in Peru. The literacy rate for people ages 65 and 
over, who are more likely to support former regimes, was 74% in 2014.48  I chose to analyze the 
campaign videos of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori because the videos offer insight into the 
campaign strategies of the two women, specifically in how they use tools such as emotional 
appeal and nostalgia to persuade voters.  
                                               
44 Travis N Rideout. “The Role of Campaign Advertising.” The Persuasive Power of Campaign Advertising, by 
Michael M Franz, Temple University Press (2011). 
45 Travis N Rideout. “How Negativity and Emotional Appeals in Ads Matter.” The Persuasive Power of Campaign 
Advertising, by Michael M Franz, Temple University Press (2011). 
46 Paul Ayodele Onanuga, and Victoria Oluwamayowa Gbadegesin. “The Enactment of Ideology and Self-
Presentation in Political Campaign Videos of the 2015 General Election in Nigeria.” Discourse, Context & Media 
(27 Nov. 2017). 
47 Tony Dunnell. “The Many Languages You’ll Hear in Peru.” TripSavvy (17 Jan 2018).  
48 “Peru: Literacy Rate.” UNESCO Institute of Statistics (12 Apr 2017). 
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With the help of professors, librarians and the Language Resource Center at the 
University of Michigan I was able to transcribe and translate all of the videos into English. I 
analyzed both the script and any visual text, as well as the visual media of the campaign videos 
for visual and verbal allusions or similarities to Keiko and Park’s fathers’ campaigns and 
governments. Analysis of the visual media was done at the consultation of professors and 
librarians at the University to confirm and further elaborate on my own research of the history 
and legacy of the political families. The limits of analyzing campaign videos is that a minute-
long video cannot communicate the extent of a candidate’s entire platform. Four videos uploaded 
onto YouTube are analyzed for Park, at recommendation from Professor Youngju Ryu. All four 
of these videos are high quality, scripted videos of similar style.  
I use five videos to discuss Keiko’s campaign. These videos were found on her political 
party’s official YouTube account. Keiko’s videos consist of different methods and seemingly 
different production values. Her videos included one following her on a day-in-the-life on the 
campaign trail, two song videos, and one featuring a voiceover of Keiko, which could be 
considered more of a “traditional” campaign video that might be seen in the United States. Of the 
day-in-the-life videos, of which there were nine days, I chose the one with the most views, which 
was Day 3. These videos will be analyzed for verbal and visual allusions to their fathers and 
kinship, as well as for gendered imagery and for policy platforms. Because Alberto Fujimori’s 
presidential campaign took place in the 1990s his campaign materials are more easily accessible. 
Comparing Keiko’s videos to his demonstrates that she used a similar campaign strategy as her 
father. Park Chung-hee’s government began in the 1960s and he did not come to power 
democratically, so I do not analyze campaign materials for him.  
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In order to fully analyze the campaign videos, I also research the history of the fathers’ 
careers using literary sources, as well as research election results, polling data, and public 
opinion from newspapers articles from election cycles. This complementary information 
provides me with a better idea of what to look for in the campaign videos and discern how the 
candidates used their fathers’ histories or points of popularity.  
 
1.4 Chapter Summary  
Chapter 2 discusses the legacies of fathers Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori. After a 
summary of the history of the two men, I examine the careers of both presidents, outlining their 
leadership styles, the positive aspects of their economic policies, and the negative aspects of their 
human rights abuses. If the daughters had similar leaderships styles and party politics to their 
fathers, then this would have helped them establish similar voting bases and kinship politics 
would benefit them. By analyzing the negative and positive aspects of the fathers’ legacies, I can 
establish to what parts of their fathers’ legacies the candidates harkened back to in their 
campaigns and to what degree. This discussion lays the groundwork for analyzing how Park and 
Keiko have either capitalized on or distanced themselves from their fathers’ governments. The 
conclusion of this chapter also begins to draw comparisons between the leaders and their 
daughters, specifically how the political landscapes of their times led to their entrances. It then 
starts to establish the kinship ties between the father-daughter pairs, considering the roles both 
women had as First Lady to their fathers.  
Chapter 3 provides analysis of campaign videos from Park Geun-hye and Keiko 
Fujimori. Campaign videos demonstrate what the candidate hopes to convey to the electorate 
using both verbal and visual cues. Rather than reading the candidates platforms and watching a 
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debate, the artistic components of a campaign video contain more apparent symbols and imagery 
that could relate to their fathers’ presidencies. Campaign videos are an effective way for a 
candidate to demonstrate to voters that she is aware of and cares about the concerns of the voters. 
Campaign videos incorporate many different methods of communication, and visuals can help 
convey messages and values that may be more difficult to express through language. Videos are 
also concise. Rather than listen to an hour-long debate between multiple candidates, a campaign 
video is a short way to find out a candidate’s political leanings and interests. This aspect also 
makes them easy to consume and to share, and can reach more people more quickly. In addition 
to television, campaign videos thrive on online video sharing and social media platforms, which 
make them easier to disseminate. A campaign video can be a candidate’s opportunity to share 
their platform, attack their opponent, or convey a sentimental message. Chapter 3 helps in 
understanding how the female candidates campaigned and what audiences and demographics 
they were targeting.   
Chapter 4 compares election and polling data from the father-daughter pairs. Election 
results and polling data complement the video analysis with empirical analysis. Election results 
show if the daughters kept the regional strongholds that their father had, highlighting the 
importance of kinship and their fathers’ legacies in their own political careers. Polling data show 
what the public thought of each president and which policies and actions were most popular and 
unpopular. By comparing the public’s opinions of the candidates to their fathers, I can 
understand for what reasons the daughters were popular and what role kinship and memory 
played in shaping the public’s opinions. The limitations of analyzing polling data is that the 
questions asked of citizens will not be the same throughout the case studies and will highlight 
different aspects of a candidate’s popularity. This data is less relevant for Keiko Fujimori, who 
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did not serve as president. I also analyze polling data stating how popular the father figures still 
are today in their respective countries, speaking to the effects of nostalgia.  
The final chapter discusses where Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori are now in their 
political careers and what their reputations are. Although issues of corruption are not included in 
the main research question, in both case studies kinship and corruption are related. Both fathers 
committed terrible human rights abuses and paid the price. Park Geun-hye was impeached for 
corruption associated with her father’s relationship with the chaebol. Keiko Fujimori was 
implicated in the bribery scandal that her father was a part of and was arrested, facing public 
backlash. I include explanations for corruption discussed by scholars and the relationship 
between kinship and corruption. I take no definitive stance on how the candidates became 
corrupt or on what their relationship of kinship and corruption was. I conclude summarizing the 
findings of my thesis and psoposing questions for future research.  
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Chapter 2: The Father’s Fraught Legacies 
 This chapter aims to discuss the careers of two authoritarian leaders, Park Chung-hee of 
South Korea and Alberto Fujimori of Peru, and how their political legacies influenced their 
daughters’ careers. Like the daughters’ case studies, I can draw parallels between Park Chung-
hee and Alberto Fujimori, specifically regarding how they rose to power during a time of crisis 
and disenchantment, and that they are best known for their “success” in economic growth in their 
respective countries. Understanding the policies and personalities of the father’s will help 
uncover what aspects of their legacies Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori distanced themselves 
from or drew upon in their own campaigns. 
 The discussion of the fathers focuses on their leadership styles, the positive legacies of 
their economic policies, and the negative legacies of their human rights abuses. The first section 
provides background on Park Chung-hee. It discusses how he became an authoritarian leader, as 
well as which aspects of his rule could have hurt or helped his daughter. The section then 
introduces the political career of Park Geun-hye and how she went from a president’s daughter to 
president herself. The second section lays out the career of Alberto Fujimori, focusing on his rise 
as a personalistic and neopopulist leader in Peru. It then outlines Keiko Fujimori’s path to 
becoming a presidential hopeful. The final section offers initial comparisons between the case 
studies of the two fathers. It analyzes the leadership styles of all four leaders and draws 
similarities between their rises to popularity. The section then discusses how the legacies of Park 
Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori have maintained positive aspects, especially among the older 
generation in their respective countries, despite their human rights abuses. Finally, it highlights 
how kinship played a role in the political entrances of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori as they 
served as First Lady to their fathers at a young age.       
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2.1 The Miracle on The Han River: Park Chung-hee’s Mixed Legacy 
In 1952, the Korean War ended leaving South Korea as one of the poorest countries in 
the world.49 The economy was slow to develop. The country was largely agricultural and relied 
heavily on imports for energy and technology.50 South Korea’s rise began in 1961 after a military 
coup by Park Chung-hee overthrew the Democratic Party. His national Five Year Plan aimed to 
develop the country's economy through expansion of agriculture and energy industries; 
improvement of infrastructure including roads, railways, and ports; full utilization of idle 
resources, including increased employment; export promotion to improve the balance of 
payments; and encouragement of science and technology.51  
Park’s final goal of developing the technology industry and the rise of the conglomerate 
chaebol is what made South Korea a successful developmental state. Park created the state-
owned Pohang Iron and Steel Company to provide cheap steel for the chaebol, who were 
founding the first automobile factories and shipyards in South Korea.52 The military government 
under Park worked closely with the chaebol companies such as Hyundai, Lotte, Samsung, LG, 
and SK Group, rewarding those who met their targets under the Five Year Plan with loans on 
easy terms of repayment, tax cuts, simple and expedited licensing processes and subsidies. This 
government protection against bankruptcy encouraged firms to undertake aggressive investment 
as they discounted downside risks.53 These companies started off in the 1950s and early 1960s 
concentrating on wigs and textiles and then grew in the 70s and 80s focusing on heavy, defense, 
                                               
49 South Korea’s lowest recorded GDP per capita was in 1955 at 64.0 USD. 
50 Jong-Sung You. “Demystifying the Park Chung-Hee Myth: Land Reform in the Evolution of Korea’s 
Developmental State,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 47:4 (5 Jun. 2017). 
51 WooJin Kang, “Democratic Performance and Park Chung-Hee Nostalgia in Korean Democracy.” Asian 
Perspective 40 (2016): 51–78. 
52 Wonhyuk Lim. “Chaebol and Industrial Policy in Korea.” Asian Economic Policy Review 7 (2012): 69–86. 
53 Michael Schuman. “Why Won't Korea's Chaebols Change? Ask Confucius.” The Straits Times (1 Mar. 2017). 
 20 
and chemical industries. Real growth happened when they turned to electronics and high-
industry in the 1990s and the chaebol helped turn South Korea’s trade deficit in 1985 to a trade 
surplus in 1986.54  
This growth, though, came at a cost for the country. Park Chung-hee believed that South 
Korea was not ready to be a fully democratic country. As he stated in his autobiography To Build 
a Nation, "Democracy cannot be realized without an economic revolution."55 Park argued that 
the poverty of the country would make it vulnerable, and therefore the priority was to eliminate 
poverty rather than establish a democratic government. His military dictatorship was 
characterized by a one-party regime. During his presidency South Koreans lived in fear of the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency, with the government frequently imprisoned dissenters.56 
South Korea's economic restoration was also prioritized at the expense of human rights as Park 
exploited the abundant supply of cheap labor, implemented media censorship, and established 
morality laws for mandatory curfews and regulations on attire and music.57 Specifically for gains 
in technological development, collusion between members of the chaebol and the government 
granted preferential statuses to the companies. The chaebol would funnel bribes to politicians 
and bureaucrats through slush funds and illegal donations. This relationship maintained the 
government's position of power, allowing the companies to secure contracts for major 
government projects and provide favorable treatment to the donor firm.58 The success of Park 
Chung-hee was amplified by the need for economic growth and stability during one of South 
Korea’s darkest times after the war.  
                                               
54 Ibid. 51 
55 Chung-hee Park. To Build a Nation (Acropolis Books, 1971). Print.  
56 Ibid. 50 
57 Ibid. 49 
58 Sherisse Pham. “South Korea's Long History of Light Sentences for Business Leaders.” CNN Money (17 Jan. 
2017). 
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2.1.1 The Start to Park Geun-hye 
Park Chung-hee’s economic success set the stage for his daughter, Park Geun-hye, and 
her political career. During his presidency she was constantly in the public spotlight as First 
Daughter and also served as First Lady at the age of 22 following the assassination of her mother 
in 1974. Almost two decades after her father’s assassination in 1979, Park finally reemerged 
from mourning when she was elected as an assemblywoman for the conservative Grand National 
Party (GNP) in the city of Daegu, close to where her father was from.59 She was reelected to this 
position three more times between 1998 and 2008. In 2004, amidst a bribery scandal of the GNP 
president, Park was appointed as the chairwoman of the party and led the re-election efforts. 
Although the party lost their majority position in Parliament, Park helped her party make 
significant gains in local elections and eventually win back a majority in 2006. Hoping to ride 
this success, Park ran for the party’s presidential nominee in 2007, but lost by a narrow margin. 
Undeterred, Park became the chairwoman of the rebranded Saenuri Party in 2011 and then won 
both the presidential nominee bid and the election in 2012.60 An analysis of Park Geun-hye’s 
campaign strategy and early career reveals how she capitalized on her father’s legacy to gain 
political popularity and win the 2012 presidential election.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
59 Young-Im Lee. “From First Daughter to First Lady to First Woman President: Park Geun-hye’s Path to the South 
Korean Presidency.” Feminist Media Studies 17:3 (2017): 377-391. 
60 Jamie Doucette. “The Occult of Personality: Korea's Candlelight Protests and the Impeachment of Park Geun-
Hye.” The Journal of Asian Studies 76:4 (2017) 851–860. 
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2.2 ¡Chino Presidente!: Alberto Fujimori’s Complicated Legacy 
 In the late 20th century Peru went through a long battle with inflation. The country faced 
austerity policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund following the Latin American 
financial crisis that began early in the 1980s. President Garcia, who preceded Alberto Fujimori, 
enacted populist economic reforms that only served to weaken the economy and shut Peru out of 
international credit markets. With a lack of access to credit and deteriorating economic 
conditions, sustained high inflation became hyperinflation in Peru.61 Peru was also being 
terrorized by the Shining Path, a communist revolutionary group which carried out terrorist 
attacks in the countryside and in cities like Lima.62 The group’s goal was to overthrow the state 
by guerrilla warfare and establish rule of the proletariat. Approximately 69,000 died in the 
rebellion and the counter-insurgency campaign it triggered between 1980 and 2000.63  
 These two crises made way for neopopulist leadership by harming the credibility of the 
existing political class and paving the way for an outsider.64 The neopopulism that emerged in 
Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by the rule of personalistic leaders, like 
Alberto Fujimori, who often took an anti-organizational stance and usually targeted the largely 
unorganized poor who were not members of preexisting political organizations.65 Fujimori 
capitalized on the profound disenchantment with outgoing president García and his party the 
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance. He campaigned heavily in poor shantytowns and 
highland regions where people were more heavily affected by the death and destruction of the 
                                               
61 Matthew Boesler. “How 9 Countries Saw Inflation Evolve into Hyperinflation.” Business Insider (5 Oct. 2013). 
62 “Americas | Profile: Peru's Shining Path.” BBC News (5 Nov. 2004). 
63 Juan Forero. “Peru Report Says 69,000 Died in 20 Years of Rebel War.” The New York Times (23 Aug. 2003) 
64 Kurt Weyland. “The Rise and Decline of Fujimori's Neopopulist Leadership.” The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of 
Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru, edited by Julio F Carrión, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006, pp. 
13–38. 
65 Kurt Weyland. “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How Much Affinity?” Latin American Studies 
Association, 2003.  
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Shining Path. Fujimori claimed to be an outsider, as he was an agricultural engineer with no 
political experience until he decided to run for president. He ran on the slogan “Un presidente 
como tu” (“A president like you”). Although he was born to Japanese immigrants and did not 
look like most Peruvians, Fujimori’s campaign strongly resonated with the disadvantaged and 
the indigenous peoples in the highlands. He promised to revive the rural economy and bring 
more infrastructure to the impoverished countryside.66 
 Fujimori enjoyed strong popular support, especially during his first term, for the way he 
addressed the two crises. When he took office in 1990, he enacted wide-ranging neoliberal 
reforms, known as Fujishock. He implemented policies of unrelenting austerity, drastically 
reducing government subsidies and government employment. Fujishock relaxed private sector 
price controls, eliminated exchange controls, and reduced restrictions on investment, imports, 
and capital. Fujimori’s measures proved effective, only further bolstering public support for his 
presidency. Inflation rapidly began to fall and foreign investment capital flooded into Peru’s 
economy. In 1994, the Peruvian economy grew at a rate of 13%, faster than any other economy 
in the world.67 Fujimori’s popularity ratings closely tracked economic policy approval ratings.68  
His strategy against the Shining Path was more controversial than his economic policies, 
and Fujimori was later found guilty by the Peruvian judiciary of human rights abuses for his 
actions. Led by Abimael Guzman, the insurgency strove to establish a perfect communist state, 
imposing its rule on the rural areas it seized, killing villagers suspected of siding with the 
government. In 1980, they burned ballot boxes during the first democratic election in 12 years.69 
                                               
66 Ellen Perry. The Fall of Fujimori. Cinema Libre Studio, 2006. 
67 John Crabtree and Jim Thomas. Fujimori's Peru: The Political Economy. Institute of Latin American Studies, 
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President Garcia’s administration at first neglected the threat posed by the Shining Path, but then 
launched an unsuccessful military campaign to eradicate it. This blunder undermined public faith 
in the state and precipitated a distrust of elites in Peru.70 Fujimori campaigned on the promise to 
free Peru from this violence and the antiterrorism policies he enacted once elected were harsh 
and effective. As soon as he entered office Fujimori granted the military broad powers to arrest 
suspected insurgents and try them in secret military courts with few legal rights. His swift action 
drew support from the populous who was unsatisfied with how previous leadership handled the 
situation, but congressional politicians raised procedural and constitutional objections.71 They 
criticized his measures for compromising the fundamental democratic and human right to an 
open trial. Fujimori contended that these measures were both justified and necessary. He claimed 
that members of the judiciary were too afraid to charge the alleged insurgents, fearing retaliation 
against them or their families. At the same time, Fujimori's government armed rural Peruvians, 
organizing them into groups known as "rondas campesinas" ("peasant patrols").72 
The naysayers in Congress, though, only strengthened support for Fujimori. While his 
opposition attacked him, they only discredited themselves. In the eyes of the citizens, they were 
established politicians concerned only with procedures and bureaucracy, obstructing government 
efficacy. In times of a clear and imminent crisis, the electorate will support the concentration of 
power in a neopopulist leader if that leader uses this concentrated power to attain concrete 
accomplishments.73 In Peru, the populous wanted solutions to problems that the government had 
previously helped to fuel or failed to address. To that end, the electorate still supported Fujimori 
after his self-coup in 1992. He temporary dissolved Congress, reorganized the judiciary, and 
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censored the press. The legislature, in which his party was a minority, was not passing his anti-
terrorism laws to defeat the Shining Path nor his economic reforms recommended by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Fujimori ended the coup after international 
pressure, but his approval ratings during the coup were as high as 82% because he posed it as a 
justification for a gridlocked congress trying to hamper his plans to help Peru.74 Fujimori rescued 
the country from imminent collapse, restored economic stability, and defeated one of the most 
dangerous guerilla groups in Latin America. Thanks to these successes, even when Fujimori’s 
tactics were not as democratic, his actions elicited support from the public. The success of Albert 
Fujimori’s presidency resulted from two crises in Peru: hyperinflation and the insurgency known 
as the Shining Path. 
 
2.2.1 Keiko’s Beginnings  
 Alberto Fujimori’s daughter Keiko entered the political sphere after he had marital 
problems with his wife Susana. Susana became an open critic of the president, publicly accusing 
him of corruption. She spoke out against him regarding human rights violations, military 
influence, insufficient social programs, and surveillance. The president “fired” Susana and Keiko 
replaced her at age 19 while she was still a student at Boston University. Susana then announced 
plans to run against him in the 1995 presidential election. Keiko served as First Lady from 1994 
to 2000 and has remained by her father’s side since.75 In 2005, she interrupted her MBA studies 
and returned to Peru after the government initiated an extradition process on her father. She 
became the leader of the Fujimorista Political Group and was elected to the Peruvian Congress 
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with more votes than any candidate, serving as a Member of the National Congress from 2006 to 
2011 for Lima.76  
 As a congresswoman and leader of her political party, Fujimori defended the reforms 
executed by her father during the 1990s. She also led the opposition to the government of 
President García, who was serving another, nonconsecutive term. She took a similar hard-on-
crime stance as her father, authoring a law that restricted penitentiary benefits for those who 
commit serious offenses, and another law that obligated judges to give the highest sanctions to 
repeat offenders.77 Keiko lost the runoff election for president in 2011 and in 2016 lost the 
presidential election by less than half a percentage point.78 Although she may not be president, 
Keiko still maintains popularity as the leader of Fuerza Popular and as a congresswoman. An 
analysis of her campaign strategy highlights that she employed similar tactics as her father to 
attain her political achievements.  
 
2.3 Initial Comparisons  
 Comparing the fathers in these two case studies strengthens similarities drawn between 
Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori. In order to discuss how the daughters capitalized or 
distanced themselves from their father’s legacies it is necessary to understand what those 
legacies exactly were for the fathers and how the fathers became such powerful leaders. All four 
leaders emerged at a time of crisis, either within their party or nationally. These crises prompted 
the leaders to create or rebrand new parties, which helped establish their political authorities and 
personalities. These similarities emphasize that the daughters maintained the ideologies and 
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leadership styles of their fathers, which contributes to the daughters’ political popularity based 
on kinship.  
 Park Chung-hee came to power as a result of a military coup. After a student protest 
ousted the authoritarian president Syngman Rhee a new democratic government took office in 
1960. The leadership, though, could not manage the social instability and economic suffering left 
by Rhee. The military, in which Park was a Lieutenant General, took over the government until 
1963 when Park was elected president of South Korea as a candidate of his newly formed 
Democratic Republican Party. The electorate distrusted the government under Rhee and 
welcomed the change from political chaos.79 While Park worked his way up through the military, 
Alberto Fujimori emerged as a political outsider. Similar to Park, Fujimori rose to power during 
a time when his country was suffering from an underdeveloped economy and the populous was 
unhappy with the previous leader. He also was elected president of Peru as a candidate of a party 
he founded, Cambio 90 (Change 90).80  
 Park Geun-hye led a split from the Grand National Party amidst a bribery scandal and 
dwindling approval ratings in 2011. She was appointed chairwoman of the Saenuri party (New 
Frontier) and in 2012 went on to win the presidency as their candidate.81 In Peru, ahead of the 
2011 presidential elections, Keiko Fujimori created her own party Fuerza Popular (Popular 
Force).82 The party’s platform was still conservative and not drastically different from her 
father’s platform, but she most likely created a new party with a new name to show that she 
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could also be her own politician and distance herself from the scandals of her father that the 
public might associate with her.  
In all four cases some crisis, whether it be national economic suffering, a bribery scandal 
within the party or human rights abuses, led to the need for the leaders to rebrand and/or create 
their own political parties. This allowed the candidates to better establish their own political 
identity and independence. In Peru especially, political parties are strongly identified with the 
leader and helps to characterize Alberto and Keiko Fujimori as personalistic leaders.  
 The fathers have a legacy necessary to consider when discussing the careers of their 
daughters. Their legacies are closely associated with the crises they mitigated and the sense of 
progress that occurred during their governments. Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori targeted 
major economic reforms which allowed their respective countries to be more competitive 
globally. Clear improvements were made, but at a cost. Leaders often champion that they 
facilitated rapid economic growth, but fail to address other issues and the ramifications of this 
growth. For example, Alberto Fujimori enjoyed relatively high approval ratings that never 
dropped below 40% into his second and third terms. He curtailed hyperinflation, but 
unemployment rates and average income were still not much better than they were in the early 
1990s.83 In South Korea, the public image of Park Chung-hye began to improve posthumously 
against the backdrop of the Asian Crisis in 1997. South Korea’s economy was in danger of 
collapsing due to a regional monetary and financial crisis. Despite his human rights abuses, 
South Korea rediscovered the authoritarian leader as a symbol of national identity. Even if 
people knew that Park Chung-hee was a dictator, they admire his record of economic growth.84 
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 The electorate in South Korea and Peru overlooked the human rights abuses committed 
by Alberto Fujimori and Park Chung-hee given their success in economic growth. Although Park 
was the architect of the “Miracle on the Han River,” he did so by subjecting laborers to harsh 
working conditions and enforcing strict regulations in a military-like manner. During his regime 
dissenters were silenced. Fujimori also abused his powers operating his military courts to defeat 
the Shining Path. His self-coup was also marked by a heavily censored press, similar to policies 
Park implemented during his rule.  
 
2.3.1 From First Daughter to First Lady 
 Park and Fujimori’s daughters were visible symbols of their regimes and both daughters 
had a unique introduction into politics. Both Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye served as First 
Lady at a young age, Park because her mother was assassinated and Fujimori because her parents 
separated. The role of First Lady is not one that legally needs to be filled or replaced, meaning 
that it was the fathers’ choices to incorporate their daughters into their governments. The women 
became symbolic of their fathers’ government from a young age, being put in the spotlight at 19, 
Fujimori, and 22, Park. 
While Park’s mother was assassinated, Alberto Fujimori was not yet divorced from his 
wife Susana when he kicked her out of the Government Palace and made Keiko First Lady. 
Fujimori retaliated against Susana who accused him of corruption. Although Keiko stood by her 
father’s side among all her parents’ drama, the separation and Susana’s presidential bid might 
have primed Peru’s political scene for Keiko’s run as well. Mirko Lauer, a political analyst, 
stated that Susana Higuchi’s high-profile campaign as a woman helped create a new notion in 
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Peru that women are more likely to vote for female candidates than before.85 In addition to being 
the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, her mother’s actions helped Keiko Fujimori’s political career. 
Keiko served as First Lady, giving her a higher profile, and the electorate became more familiar 
with the idea of a female running for high office.  
Being the eldest or only daughter, both Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye were put into 
the political spotlight by their fathers from a young age. Their roles as First Lady are a primary 
example of how kinship shaped the political careers of these two women. Many women who 
enter formal politics come from political families themselves.86 Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-
hye were highly visible symbols of their fathers’ regimes because of their position as First Lady.  
In their roles they accompanied their fathers on diplomatic trips and sponsored social projects 
and charities.  Keiko attended private meetings with the King and Queen of Spain and smiled 
with Hillary Clinton, while Park received President Jimmy Carter’s family and other foreign 
diplomats in the Blue House in Seoul. Rather than just being part of the First Family, the role of 
First Lady is closely associated with the presidency, therefore making the daughters more closely 
associated with their fathers’ legacy. This proximity helps the daughters in patriarchal societies, 
where women can be accepted as political leaders because they are seen as an extension of their 
father or husband. Park especially symbolizes her father because after she served as his First 
Lady she never married or had children. Her lack of other kinship ties and male figures in her life 
                                               
85 Ibid. 76 
86 Indira Gandhi, elected the first female prime minister of India in 1980, was the daughter of India’s first prime 
minister. Corazon Aquino, a political widow, was elected president of the Phillipines in 1986. Benazir Bhutto was 
the first female prime minister of Pakistan. Her father previously served as both prime minister and president of the 
country. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the 14th president of the Phillipines, is the daughter of the 9th president. 
Megawai Sukarnoputri was the first female president of Indonesia and is the daughter of the first president of the 
country. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was elected president of Argentina directly after her husband’s term as 
president. These women are just a few examples of high-ranking female politicians who come from political 
families. There are many other cases that could be mentioned, especially about women who serve in other positions 
such as as mayors, governors, and members of the legislature. 
 31 
more closely associates her with her father and his leadership. As a presidential candidate this 
helps her secure a constituency and gives her a platform to speak before the campaign even 
begins.87 It is already difficult for women to enter into politics, but this view that the daughters 
are an extension of their fathers, even in a patriarchal society, gives women with kinship ties a 
leg up on their female counterparts with no family ties.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the legacies of Park Chung-hee in South Korea and of Alberto 
Fujimori in Peru. It highlighted that neither can be considered democratic leaders and they both 
abused their power. Positive aspects of their legacies do exist, though. Park is credited for the 
growth South Korea experienced following the Korean War, but is also condemned for how he 
exploited cheap labor, censored the press, and silenced his opposition. Fujimori is hailed as the 
leader who finally defeated the Shining Path and opened Peru up to foreign investment after 
years of hyperinflation. In doing so, though, he was guilty of running secret military courts that 
violated human rights, as well as unconstitutionally halting the powers of the other branches of 
government. Regardless of the negative aspects of their legacies, their popularity helped launch 
the political careers of their daughters. The similarities between the leadership styles and 
ideologies of the fathers and daughters highlights how kinship influenced what kind of 
politicians the daughters would be and how having similar political personalities benefited the 
daughters in gaining a base. The cases of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori are both unique and 
similar in that both women served as First Lady to their father at a young age. This visibility 
helped the women because they were already well known to the public, but also tethered them 
                                               
87 Aswath Komath. “The Patriarchal Barrier to Women in Politics.” International Knowledge Network of Women in 
Politics (2 Oct. 2014). 
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closer to their fathers’ regimes. The following chapters delve deeper into the specific imagery 
Keiko and Geun-hye used in their campaigns and how it relates back to the legacies laid out in 
this chapter.  
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Chapter 3: Campaign Video Analysis 
 This chapter aims to analyze the campaign strategies of Park Geun-hye and Keiko 
Fujimori for reliance on kinship and nostalgia. Park and Keiko are two recent examples of 
female politicians who are kin to former male politicians. Their campaigns utilize different tools 
and methods than the campaigns of Indira Gandhi, Corazon Aquino, and other historical 
examples, allowing for a contemporary analysis of the discussion concerning kinship, memory, 
and gender. Specifically, campaign videos are a tool that can convey messages through both 
words and visuals. These videos express what policies and values a candidate prioritizes. In these 
two sets of videos I look for allusions to their father’s presidencies and legacies and examine 
how the videos communicate kinship and nostalgia. In the case of Keiko Fujimori, I access 
material from Alberto Fujimori’s presidential campaign and find parallels between their 
strategies. These allusions to and similarities with their father’s presidencies help answer the 
question of how each candidate relied on kinship and memory to gain popularity and add to a 
broader conversation of kinship, memory, and gender.  
   
3.1 Park’s Campaign  
In a series of four campaign videos Park Geun-hye highlights both her feminine and 
maternal characteristics, as well as her seasoned leadership experience. Her first video, titled 
“Crisis,”88 opens with a ship stuck in a stormy sea with crashing waves and bolts of lightning. 
Dramatic music plays in the background while a voiceover states that Korea needs a strong 
president in this time of “crisis,” not referring to any specific problem or issue. The music 
                                               
88 “박근혜 새누리당 대선후보 TV 광고 2 탄 - 위기에 강한 글로벌 리더십편 (Global Leadership in Crisis).” 
YouTube Nuri TV (12 Dec. 2012). Translation help from Professor Youngju Ryu, Director of the Korean Language 
Program at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.  
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becomes more urgent and the screen flashes twenty images of Park Geun-hye with different 
heads of state, including those from 1979 in the Blue House with President Jimmy Carter,89 from 
2007 with Secretary Condoleezza Rice in the White House,90 and from 2010 with Chancellor 
Angela Merkel in Seoul.91 The ship reaches calm and sunny waters, and the words “the five 
years to come are going to determine the future of Korea” are proudly displayed. The video ends 
with an image of Park and her slogan: First Prepared Female Candidate.  
“Crisis” showcases Park’s so-called experience and leadership abilities, and alludes to her 
father’s time in office using images from her past political career and time as First Lady. The 
video also creates a sense of urgency for the audience, and feels almost as if Park is the only 
option in this time of need. The video is open-ended, as there are no references to policy or her 
specific qualifications. The “crisis” could mean a few things, such as the economic struggles of 
the country,92 growing tensions with North Korea,93 or the declining birthrate of the country,94 
but the vagueness serves to heighten the anxiety of the viewer. Park also plays a balancing act 
between appealing to voters who are nostalgic for her father and those who saw him as an 
authoritarian dictator. The first image shown in the video of Park with President Carter has 
strategically been cropped to not include her father. At the time, Park was serving as First Lady 
and was constantly in the public spotlight, attending diplomatic meetings with her father. The 
image attempts to evoke Park’s experience in government and policy without accrediting it to her 
                                               
89 Gerhard Peters, and John T Woolley. “Jimmy Carter: ‘Seoul, Republic of Korea Joint Communique Issued at the 
Conclusion of Meetings with President Park.’” The American Presidency Project (University of California, Santa 
Barbara, 1 July 1979). 
90 “Park Geun-Hye Starts U.S. Tour.” The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition): Daily News from Korea (12 Feb. 2007). 
91 “Park Geun-Hye to Meet Angela Merkel.” The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition): Daily News from Korea (11 Nov. 
2010). 
92 Cheon Jong-woo and Yoo Choonsik. “South Korea Heads towards First Recession in 11 Years.” Reuters (22 Jan. 
2009). 
93 Jethro Mullen and Paul Armstrong. “North Korea Carries out Controversial Rocket Launch.” CNN (12 Dec. 
2012). 
94  Kim Yang-joong. “Low South Korean Birth Rate Shows Signs of Increasing.” Hankyoreh (26 Jan. 2013). 
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kinship ties. Viewers who are nostalgic for her father might be primed to remember Park within 
the context of her father’s regime, but the video does not explicitly conjure the memory of Park 
Chung-hee for viewers who do not remember him positively. The phrase “the five years to 
come” could also be reminiscent of Park Chung-hee’s Five Year Plan. Although “five years” 
explicitly refers to the presidential term limit in Korea, Park Chung-hee’s Five Year Plan is an 
iconic symbol of the economic growth the country experienced under his leadership. This 
nostalgia is especially important for Park Geun-hye to underscore in a time of economic hardship 
for Korea, alluding to the idea that she, like her father, can bring the country out of depression.  
Although she does not explicitly refer to an economic crisis, since the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis Korea has been experiencing slowed GDP growth and increased unemployment. 
The chaebol also further aggravated the issue of unequal distribution of wealth in South Korea. 
The structure of the group as a collection of family-controlled conglomerates means that most of 
the wealth in the country is concentrated within these top families. The companies also tend to 
guarantee lifetime employment to an elite group of employees, which leaves the young people in 
South Korea without secure jobs.95 Since the chaebol effectively wield monopolistic powers over 
their suppliers, workers at smaller businesses that depend on the large companies for their 
revenue often suffer from depressed wages and tough working conditions. The youth 
unemployment rate in South Korea is nearly 10%, because the jobs at non-chaebol companies 
are low-paying or nonexistent, leaving the younger generation of the country disenchanted with 
their government and their economic system.96  
                                               
95 Motoko Rich. “In South Korea, New President Faces a Tangle of Economic Problems.” The New York Times (12 
May 2017). 
96 Carlos Tejada. “Money, Power, Family: Inside South Korea’s Chaebol.” The New York Times (17 Feb. 2017). 
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None of this, though, is expressly addressed in Park Geun-hye's campaign video. She 
refers to a “crisis,” to her time in politics under her father and to his economic plan, but lets the 
viewer fill in the gaps, since her election platform cannot just be that she is her father’s daughter. 
It would be risky to openly say that because her father helped the economy she can too.  That 
direct reference would diminish her political qualifications and alienate voters who disapprove of 
her father. She also does not refer to a specific crisis because then she would have to propose a 
policy plan to address it. By leaving the reference open, Park is able to draw in a broader 
audience. The viewer can perceive whichever crisis he or she sees as most imminent or pressing, 
and then that viewer can associate Park with addressing it. 
Park Geun-hye second video, “Wound,”97 takes a softer tone. Melancholy piano music 
plays over the image of Park Geun-hye pensively looking out a window. The camera zooms in 
on Park’s face, the viewer notices a scar running down her right cheek. Black and white pictures 
of her 2006 knife attack and her recovery fade in and out on the screen. At a campaign rally a 
man slashed Park with a utility knife, causing an 11 centimeter long and 4 centimeter deep cut 
that injured her jaw muscles, requiring 60 stitches and weeks of recovery. Her apparent response 
after waking from surgery -- "How is Daejeon?" -- referring to the party's campaign in that city, 
earned her the nickname "Queen of Elections."98 In the video, Park narrates over footage of 
citizens holding vigils after the attack, stating that “you all [Korea] gave me the will to live. 
From that point on I decided to give my life to take on the wounds of the Korean people.” The 
video again ends with her slogan. 
                                               
97 “박근혜 새누리당 대선후보 TV 광고 1 탄 - '박근혜의 상처' 편 (The Wounds of Park Geun-Hye).” 
YouTube 오른소리 (27 Nov. 2012). Translation by Ryu, Youngju.  
98 “Opposition Leader Attacked by Knife-Wielding Assailant.” The Hankyoreh (22 May 2006). 
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“Wound” also has multiple meanings. The first is Park Geun-hye’s own wounds, both 
physical and emotional. Her physical wound, which is the primary subject of the video, is her 
scar that represents her dedication to her party’s 2006 campaign. Park’s wound could also be 
read as an emotional one, caused by the assassination of both her parents. This painful memory 
plays on the sympathies of the older, conservative generation in Korea who are nostalgic for Park 
Chung-hee. Highlighting Park Geun-hye’s physical and emotional wounds in this video portrays 
her as someone who has overcome many challenges and is deserving of public’s support for 
president. At the end of the video Park states that her wounds are Korea’s wounds. Like “Crisis,” 
this ambiguity could mean a number of things, such as the country’s economic downturn or their 
neighborly issues. Park saying that she will take on the pain of the people is maternalistic of her. 
While the first video channeled the commanding strength and economic themes of her father, 
“Wound” has the softer tone of her mother. The video features Park wearing her mother’s 
feminine haircut and alluding to the loss of her parents. Again, she provides no concrete 
examples or solutions, and relies purely on sentiment and her personality to campaign.  
 The third campaign video, “Mother’s Country,”99 is similar to “Wound” in that it 
highlights Park’s softer and more maternal side. The video features several black and white 
images of different women: an elderly woman sleeping on a couch, a young woman cuddling 
with her newborn, a working woman at the market, and a crying woman wearing a cap and 
gown. The images are rotated with text reading: “with an ardent heart,” “the strength,” “the 
ultimate sense of responsibility,” and “with the warm delicacy like that of a mother.” The final 
image is a smiling Park Geun-hye, followed by “I will open an era of happiness for the Korean 
people.” A song called “mother’s country” plays over the video.  
                                               
99 “새누리당 박근혜 후보 대선 광고 - 어머니의 나라 (Mother’s Country).” Youtube 오른소리 (15 Dec. 2012). 
Translation by Ryu, Youngju.  
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Narratives of motherhood and maternalism are often used to encourage and justify female 
political participation. During First-wave feminism, women argued that their political values and 
suffrage were grounded in the moral sensibilities that come from mothering.100 But even as the 
older conservative generation becomes more accepting of the shift away from the narrative that 
women should be mothers and stay at home, working women are still expected to be mothers, 
first and foremost, and should possess maternal qualities. Female politicians, though, can use this 
expectation as a selling point.101 During a campaign appeals to nurturance and the family 
formulates a political image built on fundamental values of compassion, generosity, and 
interpersonal connectedness.102 Although Park claims that she will channel these maternal 
qualities to lead Korea, she is not a mother herself. In fact, her image in Korea is somewhat of a 
Virgin Queen, married to her country.103 The cult of virginity surrounding her stems from her 
renunciation of motherhood and wifehood in order to put Korea first, forever preserving herself 
as Park Chung-hee’s daughter. The only thing maternal about her, at least in this video, is how 
she wears her hair like her late mother. Park’s mother remains South Korea’s most popular First 
Lady and is remembered for her extensive charity work. Thousands of people, mostly those in 
their 50s and older, attend memorial services on the anniversary of her assassination each year. 
Although Park never clearly defined her policy platform on economic issues such as taxation and 
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welfare, she claimed to share her mother’s vision for a more equal society and pledged to work 
toward that during her campaign.104 The video “Mother’s Country” is another example of Park’s 
campaign strategy of relying on kinship and nostalgia, in this case for her mother, to garner 
support in the 2012 presidential election.  
The final campaign video is called “Dialect”105 and addresses regional differences in 
Korea. The video opens on an older woman working at a dry cleaner while a video of Park 
giving a speech plays in the background. “I will clean up the government,” Park says on the little 
old TV, “I will be the president that cuts the chain of corruption.” The dry cleaner nods 
approvingly and says to the screen, “yeah, that’s why a woman should become president. That’s 
how things will change. Change everything!” The second part cuts to an elderly man cleaning a 
small indoor market selling dried fish, also watching the same speech on a small TV. “Everyone 
talks a big game, but not everyone can put it into effect,” Park says. “I am someone who keeps 
promises no matter what.” The man, waving his duster at the screen, says “times have changed, 
people who keep to these old ways aren’t gonna succeed. This time, Park Geun-hye, you do it. 
Change everything!”  
This video attempts to appeal to different regions in Korea based on who it features. The 
first woman speaks in a distinct Jeolla southwest dialect. This dialect is significant because the 
Jeolla Province is a historically liberal province and was the geographic base of opposition to 
President Park Chung-hee. Park arrested several of his democratic opponents from this area, 
which helped fuel the 1980 Gwangju Uprising, where approximately 600 people, many of them 
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students from Chonnam University, were fired upon, killed, and beaten by government troops.106 
This discrimination against Jeolla also came in the form of economic development as the Park 
Chung-hee administration concentrated development efforts in his conservative home province 
of Gyeongsang in the 1960s and 70s. Park neglected Jeolla and the province suffered from poor 
transportation infrastructure and experienced decreased economic growth compared to other 
regions.  
The second person featured in the video is a man speaking in a dialect prominent in the 
Gyeongsang Province where Park Chung-hee was born and raised. During his regime, his Five 
Year Plan for industrialization benefited this region disproportionately, with projects such as the 
construction of the Seoul-Busan highway which linked Gyeongsang to the capital, the creation of 
an industrial complex, and the location of the world's second largest integrated steel mill. The 
people in Gyeongsang continued to revere him and his family, demonstrated by four-fifths of 
their voters supporting his daughter in the 2012 election.107  
“Dialect” addresses several aspects of Korean politics, including the country’s regional 
divide and the economic concerns of the older generation. By featuring two people from 
different provinces between which her father’s policies exacerbated the division, Park suggests 
that she will be the one to finally heal this divide (although she fails to attribute this divide to her 
father’s policies). Park strategically leaves out part of the memory of her father’s government, 
hoping her audience and the voters will have forgotten or do not know about the negative 
implications of his policies. Why include the Jeolla dialect specifically if her father is so disliked 
there? She demonstrates that two different people, despite coming from opposing political and 
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107 “The Fading of South Korea’s Preeminent Political Dynasty.” The Economist (24 Feb. 2017). 
 41 
historical backgrounds, can agree on one thing: that Park Geun-hye is the candidate to change 
Korea. But this proposed change is again merely a suggestion, for if she were to explicitly 
apologize for what her father did, she risks distancing voters who are sympathetic to her father 
and family. The characters in the video are also older working-class people, who are more likely 
to be nostalgic for the authoritarian leader and are insecure about Korea’s economic state. Their 
lives are in the process of being supplanted as their businesses are not dependent on advanced 
technology and are under threat in an economy that rapidly introduces newer and newer 
technology.  In South Korea the government has an intimate relationship with the tech 
companies in chaebol, which is why the economy is driven by technological advancements. By 
promising to eradicate “corruption” (which implicitly refers to the government’s relationship to 
the chaebol) Park attempts to alleviate the anxieties of the older generation in Korea.  
 Although “Dialect” most directly references some of the country’s political and economic 
history and concerns, it still does not offer any solution further than cutting the “chain of 
corruption.” The president who served before Park, Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), was found 
guilty by the Seoul Central District Court of embezzling approximately $21.77 million from his 
brothers company and accepting bribes from chaebol companies like Samsung.108 Before him, 
several people in president Roh Moo-hyun’s administration (2003-2008) were arrested for 
corruption and the president himself was also accused of bribery, but was never formally 
charged.109 President Kim Dae-jung’s (1998-2003) two sons were jailed for taking bribes.110 
Even after its democratization South Korea has struggled with corruption in its political 
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leadership. The last four presidents of South Korea all campaigned on the promise to clean up 
the government, and all four were in some way implicated in scandals. Although there is a 
history of corruption in South Korea, Park claims to be the candidate who will not fall prey to 
this trend. While she gives no reason why, voters may have trusted her more than her male 
predecessors and opponents because of her gender. Several studies have shown that women are 
perceived to be more trustworthy than their male counterparts.111 This perception may account 
for why Park is trusted to “cut the chains of corruption” even though the male presidents before 
her promised the same thing in their campaigns before they too were caught in the intricate web 
of corruption. 
All four of these videos exemplify how Park Geun-hye ran a presidential campaign 
driven by nostalgia, rather than proposing specific policy changes. Park uses specific images and 
phrases to cultivate this feeling, never explicitly referencing her father or mother.  
 
3.2 Keiko’s Campaign  
 Keiko Fujimori uses a variety of videos to convey her general message that a united Peru 
is important for the country's future and that she is the people’s candidate. She does so primarily 
by featuring footage of Peruvians from all walks of life. Her first video, titled “Crime, Enough 
Already”112 conveys a sense of urgency using dramatic music and acting. The video opens with 
black and white security camera footage of crimes and criminals being taken down and 
handcuffed by law enforcement. It then switches between a male voiceover and Keiko narrating 
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over a male boxer dramatically beating up a punching bag. Words such as “insecurity,” 
“criminals,” and “rapists” are written in big bold letters on the punching bag, while the words 
“political decision” and “intelligence” show up on the gloves. Keiko states that crime is a major 
problem in Peru and she, along with her party Fuerza Popular, plan to bring order to the country.  
 Although the last major terrorist attack carried out by the Shining Path occurred in 2002, 
Peru’s overall crime rate and homicide rate have been steadily increasing and the country faces 
security threats from drug trafficking groups.113 This video highlights that part of Keiko’s 
platform is being hard on crime. Her father Alberto ran on a similar message regarding the 
ongoing insurgency in Peru, promising to rid the country of the Shining Path, during his first 
election. During his campaign he promised to defeat the Shining Path, responsible for tens of 
thousands of deaths. By the end of his government attacks had stopped almost completely and 
many Peruvians credit him for eradicating the Shining Path from the country. By taking a similar 
stance on crime as her father, Keiko can allude to the positive aspects of his legacy without 
explicitly naming him and being associated with the negative aspects of his legacy as well. 
“Crime, Enough Already” could also play upon the fears of the voters. Its footage of real crimes 
and fighting, paired with the dramatic music and voiceover, instills a sense of urgency in the 
viewer.   
How does this relate back to her approach? I do not believe that Keiko is suggesting that 
she would go outside of the bureaucracy to get justice like her father did. Rather she is creating 
this sense of urgency, making it feel like there is a problem, so she can run on the same tough-
on-crime platform that her father did. This way voters will think that she has real solutions to real 
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problems and is a candidate worth voting for. When her father ran for president there was an 
imminent threat of the Shining Path and he did not need to create a sense of urgency.  
 The second video is called “A Peru with Keiko”114 and features clips of Keiko on the 
campaign trail with a version of her theme song playing in the background. The shots are of her 
with children, with the elderly, and with crowds of her supporters waving her flag branded with 
the Fuerza Popular logo, a bright orange “K.” Most notably, though, is that in almost every shot 
she is wearing a different hat, scarf, poncho, or other item of clothing that appears to be the local 
traditional wear of the village she is visiting. This allows her constituents to physically see her as 
one of them and allows them to better relate to her. She dances and smiles with people from the 
indigenous and poor highland populations. Keiko highlights her trips to these areas in her 
campaign videos because her father focused his campaign on, and was also popular with, the 
same poor indigenous populations in rural Peru. By going to the same places and visiting the 
same people that her father visited, Keiko attempts to win the same voters that her father won 
over. During his campaign her father appealed to these populations in the same manner by 
playing music and dancing with them at rallies, passing out water bottles and t-shirts. Once 
elected, he maintained popularity in the rural areas by building schools, hospitals, and 
orphanages.115  In this video Keiko capitalizes on her father’s legacy without directly mentioning 
him. Her campaign’s theme song plays in the background and is sung to a softer melody. The 
tune is uplifting and hopeful, and the lyrics, for the most part, are simply “Vamos Keiko” (Let’s 
go Keiko) repeated.  
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The third video “The Future is Underway,”116 is similar to “A Peru with Keiko” in that it 
features a song played over footage of everyday Peruvians. The song lyrics are different in this 
campaign video and sing more about teamwork and unity but have a similar uplifting melody. 
The song features lines such as “you work day to day with sacrifice and great passion,” and 
“together we can succeed.” Several phrases appear next to the people in the video, including 
“good health,” “safe streets,” “insurance for taxi drivers,” and “fair sales tax.” These phrases 
could be considered to be a part of Keiko’s policy platform and gives the most variety of policy 
issues out of all the campaign videos. The phrases are more specific than the generic songs used 
in her other videos (except for "Crime, Enough Already"). None of the lyrics or phrases (except 
for possibly “safe streets”) could be construed as being related to Alberto Fujimori’s legacy, who 
is most known for his large scale economic reforms and fighting crimes. In the one campaign 
video for Alberto Fujimori that I was able to analyze (“El Baile del Chino”) the only line that 
could be considered to be within the theme of unity that Keiko refers to is the lyric about the 
coast, the mountains, and the jungle all being under the "rhythm of the chinaman."117 By not 
explicitly referring to her father or his specific accomplishments, Keiko Fujimori is less at risk of 
alienating voters who remember her father less fondly.  
“Ruta Peru” is a more informal vlog-esque series on Fuerza Popular’s Youtube channel, 
totaling 43 videos. I watched and analyzed “Day 3,” which had the most view counts of the 
series.118 “Ruta Peru” is comprised of footage of Keiko visiting five different villages and cities, 
dancing and singing with the local people, as well as giving speeches along the way. In this 
video Keiko wears the local dress of each of the places she visits. In Curahuasi, a district outside 
                                               
116 “¡El Futuro Está en Marcha! (The Future is Underway!).” Youtube Fuerza Popular (26 May 2016). Translated by 
Maki O’Bryan.  
117  El Baile Del Chino. Ana Kohler, YouTube (8 Dec. 2006).  
118 “Keiko Fujimori #RutaPerú - Día 3.” YouTube, Fuerza Popular (13 May 2016). 
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of Cusco, Keiko gives a speech in Quechua, an indigenous language spoken during the Inca 
Empire. Approximately 8 million people in Peru speak Quechua.119 Keiko’s Quechua, however, 
is not good and she speaks simplistically.120 Keiko uses indigenous language in her speech to 
demonstrate that she is one of them and will be a president for the indigenous populations. Her 
father also used the strategy of dressing in the traditional clothing of the indigenous 
populations.121 Alberto Fujimori won the department where Curahuasi is located (Apurimac) in 
the second round of the 1990 election, but not the first round.122 By speaking their language, 
dressing in their clothes, and going to their towns and villages, Keiko embodies her father’s 
campaign slogan from 1990 of “A President Like You” and uses a similar strategy that he did.  
The final video, titled “Vote for the Future,”123 is most similar to what a campaign video 
looks like in the United States. It features the same song and soft melody as in “A Peru with 
Keiko.” It cuts between shots of everyday Peruvians doing different things, Keiko speaking to 
the camera, and shots of Keiko interacting with people. Despite this being the only video with a 
clear script, Keiko offers no policy platform. If a viewer were to decide to vote for Keiko solely 
by watching this video it would not be because she proposed strong policy recommendations, but 
rather because the video made them feel good. Instead, she simply stresses that Peru needs to be 
united and that everyone should work together. She states that people on the right, the left, and in 
the center need to come together; that agriculture and ranching and the fishing industries can 
grow stronger; that laborers and entrepreneurs can work together; and that a responsible mining 
                                               
119 “Quechua.” The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th Ed, Encyclopedia.com (2019). 
120 Adela Carlos-Rios, University of Michigan Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Quechua 
Language Program.  
121 I was unable to find videos of Alberto Fujimori speaking an indigenous language on the campaign trail, but in the 
video El Baile del Chino he is seen wearing indigenous dress. When you Google “Alberto Fujimori Quechua” the 
first hits are for articles about his forced sterilization of indigenous women.  
122  The International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Republic of Peru 
123 “¡Votemos por el Futuro! (Vote for the Future!).” YouTube Fuerza Popular (30 May 2016). Translated by Maki 
O’Bryan.  
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industry can live in harmony with the environment.124  She did not specify what this unity would 
accomplish.  
Although Keiko calls for unity, Peru does not experience high levels of political 
partisanship. Rather, this could reflect the diversity of political parties that exist within the 
country, but this leads to a weak party system.125 In Peru Political parties are usually created 
around political personalities, as demonstrated by Alberto Fujimori founding Cambio 90 in 1990 
and Sí Cumple in 1998, and Keiko Fujimori founding Fuerza 2011 in 2009 and rebranding it as 
Fuerza Popular for the 2016 presidential election. The reason for Keiko founding her own party 
though, was also an attempt to further herself from her father’s legacy. She branded herself, her 
party, and her campaign focusing just on her first name, leaving out the last name that connects 
them. The symbol of her Fuerza Popular Party is a “K” for Keiko, putting distance between her 
and her father.126 By distancing herself from her father she made her kinship ties more implicit, 
letting the voters who support her family name also support her, but also letting the voters who 
are unsure focus on her alone.  
 
                                               
124 Edras Rodriguez-Torres, a librarian at the University of Michigan focused in Latin American politics, suggests 
that Keiko’s call for unity could refer to regaining the trust of people who were harmed by her father’s government. 
Although Alberto Fujimori is hailed as the president who eradicated the Shining Path, his militaristic methods left 
many rural villages weaker and harmed innocent people. Keiko wants these people to once again trust her family 
name and trust the government. She wants people from all demographics and geographies to unite under her 
government and work together.  
125 Christopher Carter. “Party System Erosion: Evidence from Peru.” Party Politics (Aug. 2018). 
126 Ibid. 115 
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Figure 3.1: Fuerza Popular’s Logo127 
Keiko’s call for unity in “Vote for the Future” more likely refers to the geographic and 
ethnic diversity that exists in Peru. The country is split into three regions: the jungle, the coast, 
and the highlands, and these geographic differences also divide the people and industry.128 Peru 
is also home to many different ethnicities. The indigenous and Amerindian population 
constitutes 26% of the country and the majority (60%) are mestizos, people of mixed ancestry. 
There are also black Afro-Peruvians, white Europeans, and Chinese and Japanese populations in 
Peru.129  
In addition to not outlining her own platform or qualifications, this video does not have 
any clear allusions to her father or his policies. Under Keiko’s narration of people working 
together is footage of friends hugging, mothers holding their children, laborers working on the 
field and in boats smiling, and Keiko shaking hands and dancing with her indigenous supporters. 
The overarching message of “Vote for the Future” is that Keiko is a candidate that can make 
cooperation happen as president. The lack of a clear platform or her qualifications, but the 
insistence that she is the candidate to unify Peru, could be interpreted as Keiko relying on 
                                               
127 “Fuerza Popular.” Facebook, 2017, www.facebook.com/PFuerzaPopular/. 
128 “Peru: General Information.” Peruanos En Stanford, Stanford University (2004). 
129 "Perú: Perfil Sociodemográfico.” Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2017). p. 214. 
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viewers to connect that she will make it work just as her father made a failing Peruvian economy 
work.   
All five videos, except for the first one, are stylistically similar. Specifically, they all 
feature candid footage of people, whether it’s a few people waving at the camera or Keiko 
addressing a rally of supporters. This characteristic of the videos conveys that Keiko would be a 
candidate for the people. She goes out of her way meet her constituents, especially those poorer, 
indigenous populations in the countryside, and has heard their needs. Although important for a 
presidential candidate to meet constituents, Keiko offers little concrete policy in her campaign 
videos. In a few videos, though, she does tell what her goals are generally on crime and 
economic reform, which are similar to her father’s. The song lyrics and scripts used are also 
similar throughout the videos. Phrases that consistently appear are “Let’s go Keiko,” “President 
Keiko,” “the coast, the mountains, and the jungle” and if “Fuerza Popular” (Popular Force) is 
not directly mentioned, “fuerza” is used in another context. The line “the coast, mountains, and 
the jungle” is consistent with the theme of a united Peru featured throughout the videos. Her 
message was: no matter what terrain, no matter the job or the industry, no matter whether you’re 
old or young, male or female, indigenous or not, everyone in the country is stronger together.  
Keiko’s campaign strategies and videos are also similar to her father’s 1990 campaign. 
Alberto Fujimori used a song called “El Baile del Chino” (the Dance of the Chinaman) during 
his campaign.130 He would play this song at his rallies in the poor rural areas and the audience 
would sing and dance with him. The song is similar to “Vamos Keiko” and is upbeat and 
repetitive. Their songs also share lyrics; “El Baile del Chino” sings “The rhythm of the 
chinaman/It’s in the coast/It’s going to the mountains/And in the jungle/The rhythm of the 
                                               
130 Ibid. 117 
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chinaman.”131 “Vamos Keiko” sings “Let’s go until we win/The future is in your hands/the coast, 
the mountains, and the jungle/Let’s go Fuerza Popular.”132 A voter who supported Alberto 
Fujimori in 1990 and knew his campaign song would probably feel similar listening to Keiko’s 
song in 2016. Keiko Fujimori targeted the same people and used similar strategies as her father 
to harness his 1990 popularity. Her father was a skilled grass-roots politician and diligently 
crisscrossed Peru to give stump speeches to small audiences, a strategy Keiko also adopted, as 
highlighted in her campaign videos. As she visited these rural and poor areas, she would offer to 
install running water in towns where there was none, provide uniforms and shoes to 
schoolchildren, and build hospitals and airports and universities. Building infrastructure, 
especially schools, in rural areas is something Alberto Fujimori is remembered fondly for by the 
people in these areas.133 Using song and dance, as well as visiting these particular populations is 
unique to Alberto and Keiko Fujimori. The campaign videos of the other 2016 presidential 
candidates did not feature songs, dance, or meeting poor indigenous people.134  
Ahead of the first round of elections in 2016, Keiko was a front-runner and played it safe. 
She largely avoiding public statements and giving interviews, and skipped a presidential debate 
in February. This avoidance of appearances allowed her to evade questions about campaign 
financing, corruption scandals that a few Fuerza Popular officials were involved in, and whether 
she would pardon her father. Keiko did not explicitly mention her father in her run for president, 
although she did mimic his campaign style and strategy. Keiko also offered more of a concrete 
platform in her videos and relied less on memory in her campaign than Park Geun-hye.  
                                               
131 Ibid. 117 
132 Ibid. 115 
133 Ibid. 115 
134 “PPK Última Llamada.” YouTube, ÚLTIMA LLAMADA PPK (23 May 2016); “El #FrenteAmplio Por 
#ElNuevoPerú.” YouTube, Frente Amplio Perú (31 Jan. 2016). 
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3.3 Comparisons 
The campaigns of Keiko Fujimori and Park Geun-hye utilize memory differently, but 
both feature videos alluding to the father’s legacies. Park had specific phrases and images that 
referred to her father’s government and policies, while Keiko used a campaign strategy that 
mimicked her father’s. Keiko’s campaign also differed in that she avoided speaking about her 
father and the pardon process he was going through at the time and she also offered more of a 
platform than Park did in her videos. Park’s videos draw upon aspects from her past, such as the 
time she served as First Lady, and this lends as a reference to her father’s regime. The videos’ 
emphasis on economic reform and prosperity also allude to the positive legacy of Park Chung-
hee’s economic success in South Korea during the 1980s. Keiko’s videos implicitly reference her 
father’s era by making crime a focal point of her campaign, as well as by heavily featuring 
Peruvians from the poor countryside and indigenous people from the highland regions.  
Park’s videos were more nuanced and told more of a story than Keiko’s did. Each of her 
four videos had a distinct theme, from “Crisis” to “Dialect” and showcased different parts of her 
campaign strategy. The imagery and language used in “Crisis” and “Wound” made references to 
her political past. “Crisis” used images from her time as First Lady, and “Wound” told a story 
about a previous campaign she worked on for the Saenuri party. These two videos could speak to 
the political qualifications of Park Geun-hye. “Mother’s Country” is a video that relies heavily 
on emotional appeal. Park uses imagery and language to suggest that she is a maternal and 
feminine candidate, while Keiko does not. This could be to compensate for the fact that Park is 
not a mother (while Keiko is) and symbolize that she does have family values.  
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Keiko’s videos, particularly “Crime, Enough Already” and “The Future is Underway,” 
make more specific policy references than do Park’s. Although they are just general phrases, 
“secure streets,” “fair taxes,” and “insurance for taxi drivers,” gives voters a sense of what her 
priorities and goals are but leaves open how she would accomplish them. Both campaigns, 
though, primarily rely on conjuring emotions within the voters to garner support. Park’s videos, 
on one hand, have more of a range of emotions to them. “Crisis” is fear and urgency. “Wound” is 
sympathy and determination. “Mother’s Country” is warmth and hope. “Dialect” is unity and 
change. Keiko’s, on the other hand, mostly convey positive feelings of togetherness, especially 
through her use of songs. The one video I would not categorize as positive is “Crime, Enough 
Already” which, similarly to Park’s “Crisis” instills a sense of urgency in the viewer.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Visual symbols, text and dialogue, as well as general styles and strategies in Park Geun-
hye and Keiko Fujimori’s respective campaign videos demonstrate that both candidates alluded 
to their fathers’ regimes. These allusions were employed to evoke nostalgia in voters who 
support the fathers and remember them fondly, but were subtle enough to avoid driving away 
voters who did not view them positively. An analysis of election results reveals that both 
campaigns were fairly effective. Park Geun-hye narrowly won the presidency with 51.6% of the 
vote. Keiko Fujimori, however lost her election by less than 1%, but still maintains political 
strength as the leader of Fuerza Popular and as a congresswoman. Even though Keiko Fujimori 
lost, I argue that kinship politics and memory benefitted both candidates. Based on my analysis 
of the campaign videos and the polling data examined in the next chapter, I conclude that 
nostalgia played a greater role in, and was more effective, in Park’s case study.   
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Chapter 4: Election Results and Polling Data 
This chapter aims to analyze empirical data from election results and public opinion polls 
regarding Park Geun-hye, Keiko Fujimori, and their fathers. These numbers can illustrate the 
priorities and the decisions of the voters. Voting data can reveal if the regional and demographic 
bases of the fathers were passed down to the daughters come their elections and public opinion 
can reveal how the voters came to these decisions. By comparing who voted for the father or 
daughter, and why, I can better understand the role of kinship and memory in the case studies of 
the Parks in South Korea and the Fujimoris in Peru. The case in Korea offers stronger evidence 
that nostalgia for Park Chung-hee influenced the election of his daughter, using polls that ask 
current Korean citizens about their opinion of the late authoritarian leader. Although polling data 
on the popularity of Alberto Fujimori during his three terms are documented in the literature, 
current public opinion on the former president in Peru and public opinion on his daughter has 
been more difficult to find. The strength of evidence for the South Korea case, though, 
demonstrates that Park Geun-hye benefited greatly from her kinship ties and nostalgia for her 
father and his government.   
 
4.1 South Korea 
 4.1.1 Park Chung-hee Nostalgia 
Park Geun-hye clearly benefited from the popularity and successes of her father. The 
2012 presidential election in South Korea was historic for several reasons. The election was the 
highest voter turnout in nearly two decades at 75.8%, signaling that the citizens cared and 
believed they could make an impact. Park Geun-hye won with a narrow victory of 51.6% of the 
vote, but her win was the first time in 41 years that a candidate received an actual majority of 
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votes. The last time this occurred was in 1971 when her father, Park Chung-hee, won with 53.2% 
of the votes.135 Election results show that support for Park Geun-hye in 2012 exceeded 80 
percent in the North Gyeongsang Province, the region with a traditionally strong, conservative 
stance, which also showed a high level of support for her father, Park Chung-hee.136  
Nostalgia for Park Chung-hee is apparent in public opinion polls and helped his daughter 
win the presidential election in 2012. Nostalgia for the dictator has been widespread in South 
Korea since the 1997 economic crisis. As the country realized how vulnerable its economy 
was—and against the backdrop of the government signing an unprecedented bailout deal with 
the IMF—nostalgia for Park, the “strong man and leader,” heightened.137 Citizens yearned for 
the former president and his strong economic record, but Park Chung-hee nostalgia is a 
systematic phenomenon, going beyond mere respect for a charismatic former leader.138 Park has 
been selected consistently as the former president most citizens would choose to reelect.139 More 
than half of respondents also chose Park as Korea’s best-performing government. They view his 
government’s performance much more positively than that of any democratic government.140 
Furthermore, according to a 2010 Korean Barometer Survey, Park’s government was ranked as 
Korea’s best government by more than one-third (34.9%) of respondents after the 1960s. 
Considering his conservative policies and leadership, Park’s government is also politically 
supported by a considerable portion of progressive voters at 28.4%.   
                                               
135 Youngmi Kim. “The 2012 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in South Korea.” Electoral Studies (3 June 
2014): 326–330. 
136 “Trial-Heats of the 2012 Presidential Election by Gallup Korea.” Seoul: Gallup Korea. (2013) 
137 Guy Podoler. “‘Who Was Park Chung-hee?’ East Asia: an International Quarterly. (2016) 
138 Other notable examples include nostalgic sentiment toward a leader is communism in post-communist countries; 
unwavering support for Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, a growing fondness for Mahathir in Indonesia and a nostalgic 
reverence for Chavez in Venezuela. 
139 WooJin Kang. “The Past is Long-Lasting: Park Chung Hee Nostalgia and Voter Choice in the 2012 Korean 
Presidential Election.” Journal of Asian and African Studies. (2016) 
140 18.24% of the respondents of the same survey viewed the Kim Dae-jung government positively and 17.16% did 
for the Roh Moo-hyun government.  
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Korean nostalgia also reflects the public’s acceptance, and even active advocacy of, 
Park’s governing ideology of developmentalism, which places economic development at the 
forefront of the country’s political endeavors. Even during democratic consolidation, the Korean 
people retain a strong preference for economic growth at more than 50% (the highest score was 
69.59% in 2003). By contrast, they express only half-hearted appreciation of the relative 
importance of democracy (at best below 25% in 2011). This statistic highlights that the 
governing ideology of authoritarian regimes during Korea’s industrialization period continues to 
attract overwhelming support, diminishing the importance of democracy. The Korean public’s 
preference for developmentalism has never fallen below 50%.141 
 “Restorative Nostalgia,” as described by Boym,142 can be applied to nostalgia for Park 
Chung-hee. South Korea in the 1970s was still a poor country and was also marked by Park 
Chung-hee’s period of martial law, so why would people be nostalgic for this time? Boym 
characterizes restorative nostalgia as “simplified.” In South Korea yearning for the authoritarian 
leader is associated with a yearning for a simplified sense of progress and improvement that 
existed during his period of rapid modernization, excluding the negative aspects of his 
government. Restorative nostalgia harkens backs to an ideal South Korea that Park’s daughter 
can recover.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
141 Ibid. 139 
142 p. 27 
 56 
4.1.2 Park Geun-hye’s Capabilities 
Before the 2012 presidential election, the Korean Elections Panel Study asked voters 
about their opinions of the top three candidates. When rated on ability to understand the 
problems of ordinary people, opposition candidate Moon Jae-in received a 38.24% approval 
rating, beating Park Geun-Hye at 27.70%. However, Park ranked first in the two remaining 
areas: the candidate’s ability to manage national affairs (48.29%) and his or her ability to make 
people better off (38.10%), well ahead of the other candidates.143 In regards to capability, 
though, Moon was a former chief secretary and Ahn Cheol-soo was a successful CEO. Park had 
no direct experience of governmental affairs; nevertheless, the public valued her ability to 
manage governmental affairs and revive the economy. Given her relatively thin career, her high 
capability ratings could be significantly associated with public nostalgia for her father. 
 
 
Fig 4.1: Voters’ Evaluations of Major Candidates’ Capabilities in the 2012 South 
Korean Presidential Election144 
                                               
143 Ibid. 139 
144 Ibid. 139 
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Nostalgia for the late authoritarian leader could also have translated to the older 
generation’s support for Park Geun-hye. Starting with the 2002 presidential election, 
generational politics created a sharp contrast between the electoral choices of Korean youth 
(voters in their 20s and 30s) and older voters (in their 50s and 60s). According to recent studies, 
patterns of generational politics in the 2012 presidential election were significantly different 
from those seen in other elections.145 Before the 2012 election, the generational divide worked in 
favor of the progressive bloc, as in the 2002 election. In 2012, the opposite was the case, with 
older people rallying around Park. Older voters remember the country’s poverty before Park 
Chung-hee took power in a 1961 military coup. They lived through South Korea’s rags-to-riches 
transition and still revere the former president, while Korean under the age of 40 never knew that 
poverty. The younger generation, especially students, viewed Park Geun-hye’s candidacy and 
presidency as reverting back to an era where dissenters and student activists were persecuted and 
tortured.146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
145 Koh, 2013 and Park, 2013 as cited in Kang, 2016.  
146 Hans Schattle. “South Korea’s Generation Gap” The New York Times. (21 Dec 2012).  
 58 
 
Table 1: Results by Province for the 1963 and 2012 Presidential Elections in South Korea 
Province or City Park Chung-hee (1963) Park Geun-hye (2012)  
TOTAL 46.6% 51.56% 
Busan 48.2% 59.82% 
South Gyeongsang 61.7% 63.12% 
North Gyeongsang 55.6% 80.82% 
Jeju 70.0% 50.46% 
Seoul 30.1% 48.18% 
Gangwon 40.0% 61.97% 
Gyeonggi 33.1% 50.43% 
South Chungcheong 40.8% 56.66% 
North Chungcheong 39.8% 56.22% 
South Jeolla  57.2% 10.00% 
North Jeolla  49.4% 13.22% 
Colors indicate whether or not the candidate won the province or city, red indicating a loss and green indicating a 
win.147 
                                               
147 Adam Carr’s Election Archive. Republic of Korea, Presidential Election, National summary and voting by 
province. His source: Korean National Election Commission website.  
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Fig 4.2: Visualization of Above Data  
 
 
In Kang’s analysis of the 2012 Korean Elections Panel Study, he found that regional 
divisions, although identified as an important division in Korean politics, did not garner any 
statistical support in the public opinion polls.148 In simply looking at the provincial breakdowns 
of the results from the 1963 election and 2012 election, the father-daughter pair only won four 
out of 11 of the same provinces and lost one of the same provinces. In the other six provinces 
one or the other won.149  
The election results from Gyeongsang and Jeolla in 2012, though, do reveal attitudes 
toward the late authoritarian leader. Although she won, Park Geun-hye’s video “Dialect” clearly 
did not resonate with the voters of Jeolla.150 While her father won both provinces, these were the 
two places she received the least number of votes. “Dialect” was the campaign video in which 
                                               
148 Ibid. 139 
149 Ibid. 147 
150 This campaign video, as well as others, are discussed further in Chapter 3.  
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Park attempted to address and reconcile the differences between the two regions of Gyeongsang 
and Jeolla. On one hand, Gyeongsang is where Park Chung-hee was born and raised. During his 
regime, his Five Year Plan for industrialization benefited this region disproportionately.151 In 
North Gyeongsang an overwhelming 80.82% voted for Park Geun-hye in 2012 and 63.12% of 
South Gyeongsang voted for her as well. On the other hand, Jeolla was home to the opposition of 
Park Chung-hee. Park arrested several of his democratic opponents from this area and Jeolla also 
remained underdeveloped compared to the rest of South Korea under his Five Year Plan.152 His 
daughter dismally lost North and South Jeolla, at 13.2% and 10%, respectively.  
  
4.2 Peru  
4.2.1 Tsunami Fujimori  
Keiko Fujimori, unfortunately, did not enjoy that success her father did in his three terms 
as president of Peru. Alberto Fujimori’s surprising win in the 1990 election was dubbed his 
“tsunami.”153 As a political newcomer, Fujimori was one of five minor candidates who together 
claimed no more than one percent of voter preferences in public opinion polls in March of 1990, 
one month before the first round of elections. Yet, on April 8th he almost matched the vote for 
the favorite to win, novelist Mario Vargas Llosa.154 On June 10th, Alberto Fujimori beat Vargas 
Llosa and clinched the presidency with 62.4% of the runoff vote.  
Fujimori’s tsunami can be attributed to the decline of Peru’s party system in the 1980s 
and Vargas Llosa’s inability to appeal to the median voter. Vargas Llosa’s alliance with the 
                                               
151 “The Fading of South Korea’s Preeminent Political Dynasty.” The Economist (24 Feb. 2017). 
152 Se Young Jang. “The Gwangju Uprising: A Battle over South Korea's History.” The Wilson Center (17 July 
2017). 
153 Gregory D. Schmidt. “Fujimori’s 1990 Upset Victory in Peru: Electoral Rules, Contingencies, and Adaptive 
Strategies.” Journal of Comparative Politics. (1996) 
154 Julio F. Carrión. “Public Opinion, Market Reforms, and Democracy in Fujimori’s Peru.” The Fujimori Legacy: 
the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru. (2006) 
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established conservative party severely compromised his candidacy, while Fujimori and his new 
party Cambio 90, appealed to voters longing for a break from the past. Fujimori’s Japanese 
ancestry and accented Spanish could have also helped him win the vote of the poor indigenous 
and mestizo majority of Peru. Vargas Llosa, a wealthy novelist of Spanish descent, represented 
Peru’s white, westernized elite.  
Fujimori made it a point to campaign heavily in the poorer provinces and shantytowns, 
but even won Lima over, which is typically associated with the Peruvian elite and would have 
been considered a stronghold for Vargas Llosa. In Fujimori’s 1995 landslide victory, where no 
runoff election took place, he swept all 43 of Lima’s districts, running strongest in the poorest 
parts of the city.155 Although Keiko Fujimori also targeted the poor and indigenous areas that her 
father was so popular in, it was not enough to win her neither the election in 2011 nor 2016. 
Lima, which she did not win in the runoff election, accounts for approximately a third of the total 
votes in Peru.  
Alberto Fujimori’s tsunami is largely credited to his position as a political newcomer and 
him having no strong ties with existing political parties. He founded his party Cambio 90 while 
he was an agricultural engineer and mathematics professor at Universidad Nacional Agraria. 
The party’s membership began growing, gaining support from people such as technically 
oriented university professors, Peru’s evangelical protestant community, and emerging informal 
entrepreneurs of mostly indigenous and mestizo descent. These groups shared a sense of 
alienation from a political system that had historically accorded favors to a privileged few.156 
Cambio 90 and Alberto Fujimori’s message and image as a political outsider, an everyday 
                                               
155 Ibid. 153 
156 Ibid. 153 
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person, resonated with many in Peru as he shot from claiming less than 1% in the polls to 
winning the 1990 election in a matter of months. 
Keiko Fujimori lost despite her father enjoying relatively high and consistent approval 
ratings throughout his three terms. These ratings though, are most likely affected by Alberto 
Fujimori’s regime’s control of the media and its influence on public opinion.157 Fujimori knew 
how to spin stories in his favor. The day after his self-coup in 1992 independent polls showed 
that 71 to 87% of Peruvians approved of the temporary dissolution of congress and the call for 
new legislative elections in 1993, and almost 95% approved of the forced reengineering of the 
judiciary.158 Even in his second term, after the public became highly critical of his economic 
policies, his approval ratings never dropped below 40%.159 In his third term Fujimori’s regime 
was implicated in buying arms illegally from Jordan and Colombia in August of 2000. Despite 
the following media frenzy and with a significant sector of the country’s population now actively 
opposing the regime, Fujimori maintained an approval rating of 53%.160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
157 Sebastián Calderón Bentin. “The Politics of Illusion: The Collapse of the Fujimori Regime in Peru.” Theatre 
Survey. (2018) 
158 Ibid. 154 
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Table 2: Results from All Presidential Election Alberto and Keiko Fujimori Appeared In 
Election First Round Second Round 
Alberto Fujimori (1990) 29% 62.4% 
Alberto Fujimori (1995) 64.4% n/a 
Alberto Fujimori (2000) 49.85% 74.3% 
Keiko Fujimori (2011) 23.55% 48.55% 
Keiko Fujimori (2016)  39.82% 49.88% 
Colors indicate whether or not the candidate won the election, red indicating a loss and green indicating a win. 
Only in the 1995 election was there a clear winner in the First Round and no runoff occurred.161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
161 Ibid. 122 
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Fig 4.3: First and second round results for Alberto Fujimori’s 1990 presidential campaign.  
 
 
Fig 4.4: First and second round results for Keiko Fujimori’s 2016 presidential campaign.  
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4.2.2 Keiko’s Popularity  
 Keiko, however, could never claim this outsider appeal simply by virtue of his kin. Keiko 
could not be a political outsider because of her record as First Lady and as a congresswoman. 
During her campaign she did, though, play the everyday candidate and appealed to similar 
demographics that her father was popular with. Her strategy was effective, but not effective 
enough as she lost both the 2011 and 2016 presidential elections by narrow margins (48.55% and 
49.88 respectively).162 Although she was not a political outsider, Keiko was still different than 
her educated-elite opponents of European-descent (just as Alberto Fujimori was different than 
Vargas Llosa in 1990). Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of the PPK was a Polish-Peruvian former World 
Bank economist and Wall Street banker, and Veronika Mendoza of Frente Amplio was a French-
Peruvian psychologist and educator.163  
Going into the first round of voting in the 2016 elections, Keiko was the front-runner and 
her support was the most evenly distributed nationwide of the top three candidates. Of the three, 
Keiko was the candidate with the most votes in 113 out of the 196 provinces and had relatively 
homogenous results territorially, except for some of the poor southern provinces, where 
Mendoza’s electorate was concentrated.164 Kuczynski’s support came mainly from urban voters 
and the more developed provinces. The pro-Kuczynski vote of a province was strongly 
correlated with that province’s Human Development Index (HDI), figuring life expectancy, 
education, and per capita income indicators.165 Keiko also did well in the most populated 
provinces, including Lima, Callao, Trujillo, Chiclayo, Huancayo and Ica. Keiko’s supporters 
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come from almost every socioeconomic level in Peru. Her voters came from both the more and 
less well-off provinces, as did her father’s in his time, with that support being especially strong 
from poor rural and lower-class urban voters.166 Kuczynski and Mendoza both ran a close race 
for second place, although in the end Kuczynski pulled ahead more than polls predicted and won 
21.05% of the vote. PPK’s support is far more regionalized and less uniform territorially than 
Keiko’s.167 Figure 4.4 displays the 2016 election results by region.  
In her campaign Keiko presented herself as a moderate, attempting to distance herself 
from her father’s hard-right brand of fujimorismo and authoritarian regime and legacy. She also 
dropped some of her father’s longest-serving, most loyal and extreme supporters from her party’s 
list of congressional candidates.168 As she walks a fine line between taking credit for her father’s 
achievements and distancing herself from his abuses, Keiko has also engaged in historical 
revisionism. Alberto Fujimori committed “errors” rather than crimes, she said on the campaign 
trail.169 She stated that her father’s notorious state program of sterilizations, which he intended to 
reduce poverty, was betrayed by a handful of rogue doctors who ignored protocols. Human rights 
campaigners have said that this program resulted in the bullying and tricking of hundreds of 
thousands of mainly poor, often indigenous, women into unwanted procedures.170  
Keiko needed voters to remember the positive aspects of her father’s government, and 
many of them did. Veronica Valdivia, who is a resident of a Lima slum, was uprooted from her 
home by the Shining Path. She stated that “Keiko has learned a lot from her father, but she won’t 
repeat the bad things her father did because she is a young woman with fresh ideas.”171 In 
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Valdivia’s case, she does recognize the negative aspects of Alberto Fujimori’s legacy, but 
nonetheless supports Keiko. Although she is just one supporter, Valdivia’s sentiment begs the 
question of whether Keiko is thought to be a good candidate for president, despite her father’s 
legacy, because she is a “young woman.” Several studies have shown that women are perceived 
to be more trustworthy than their male counterparts.172 Marilyn Boltz states that women are 
thought to be more trustworthy because of how men and women are taught to play their 
respective gender roles. Men are encouraged to brag about themselves and assert themselves 
over others, while women are encouraged to be more modest and develop relationships with 
others.173 Being their fathers’ daughters Keiko and Park should not be thought of as trustworthy 
candidates, but their gender may lessen this blow to their political image.   
 Keiko’s popularity was also fueled by a strong anti-incumbent tide. During the 2016 
election outgoing President Ollanta Humala’s approval ratings were at 12% after he was charged 
with taking bribes from a Brazilian contracting company in exchange for government 
contracts.174 Elected governments in Peru have continuously broken promises the last 15 years, 
said Steven Levitsky, a political scientist and columnist for La República, a leading Peruvian 
newspaper. “Authoritarian governments are looked on in Peru as being more responsive and 
representative than democratic ones.”175 According to Latinobarómetro, a public interest polling 
company, only 24% of Peruvians are satisfied with democracy.176 This statistic and Levitsky’s 
analysis demonstrates the dichotomy between kinship and democracy as discussed by Mina 
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Roces.177 Particularly to those living in the poor, rural, indigenous areas of Peru, kinship and 
family values could be more important than values of democracy, especially if it means the 
government will operate more efficiently. Keiko’s loss in 2016 can be attributed, at least in part, 
to Veronika Mendoza’s endorsement of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. Mendoza finished third in the 
primary election with 18.8% of the votes after Keiko (39.8%) and Kuczynski (21%).178 Although 
Keiko lost, she lost by a narrow margin and is still a popular figure in Peruvian politics despite 
the negative aspects of her father’s legacy and his vocal dissenters.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
While the polls suggest that nostalgia for Park Chung-hee helped his daughter win the 
2012 presidential election in Korea, the same cannot be said for Keiko Fujimori in Peru.179 Keiko 
lost both attempts to become president and despite mimicking her father’s campaign strategy, 
polling and voting data do not reveal a consistent, shared regional stronghold. The Fujimori case 
study lacks the nostalgia toward Alberto Fujimori which exists in Korea toward Park Chung-hee. 
Although Keiko lost her elections, she still enjoys political popularity in congress and as a party 
leader. I can still claim that Keiko was able to strategically walk the line between her father’s 
positive and negative legacies to try to win both supporters and non-supporters of her father to 
garner popularity. Both Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori benefited from being the daughters 
of authoritarian male presidents in South Korea and Peru.  
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Knowing the candidates’ kinship ties, were the voters who supported both candidates not 
afraid that the daughters too would be corrupt? Or did they not care, or not believe, that their 
fathers were corrupt? Both countries have a clear pattern of corruption within the presidency. 
Does this mean that voters do not mind if a president does not act democratically as long as there 
is perceived progress? Polling data demonstrates a clear dichotomy between democracy and 
efficiency in the minds of the voters. In South Korea, citizens prefer economic development to 
democracy and in Peru polls showed that voters value a government being responsive rather than 
being completely democratic. Did their supporters vote for Park and Keiko because they thought 
the women were the best democratic choice? Or because they thought the women would get 
things done? Now that I have established that Park and Keiko were popular (even though Keiko 
lost) because of kinship and memory, I will now explore the negative ramifications of kinship 
politics in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Corruption  
In this thesis I found that kinship ties allowed Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori to have 
political careers. Their presidential campaign videos demonstrated how each candidate walked 
the thin line of their fathers’ fraught legacies. In Park’s case, she relied more on the memory of 
her father and his government. Nostalgia for Park Chung-hee was particularly effective because 
his memory is equated to economic development, and his daughter ran after the instability of the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Although Keiko mimicked her 
father’s campaign strategy and attempted to appeal to the same base he was popular with, she 
also offered more of a platform in her videos than Park did. That being said, nostalgia did not 
work in Keiko’s favor in either of the presidential elections she ran in. This could possibly be 
because her father is still alive and in prison for the crimes he committed, while Park’s father 
was assassinated over three decades before his daughter’s campaign. Kinship also helped the two 
candidates because they had an early start to their political careers by serving as First Lady to 
their fathers. Women are already underrepresented in politics, and those who hold high offices 
tend to come from political families. Serving in unofficial roles, such as First Lady, help women 
enter into politics. Gender can also benefit a candidate, even those coming from families with 
contested legacies, because women are perceived to be more trustworthy and nurturing than their 
male counterparts.  
To conclude this thesis, I begin to analyze the relationship between kinship and 
corruption in politics, a topic that requires future research. I discuss how a country’s structure 
and values, specifically pertaining to family, can explain cases of corruption, and outline the 
crimes of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori. Although corruption is not central to the research 
question of how kinship and memory are utilized in political campaigns, it can be an important 
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implication of electing kin to positions of power. I am not making the claim that kinship politics 
causes corruption, however in these two cases both the fathers and daughters were corrupt and 
the positive legacies of the fathers helped the daughters be elected.  
 
5.1 Corruption and Kinship 
 Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain.”180 However, Daniel Smith states that this simple definition of corruption assumes a 
rigid dichotomy between the public and private, and individual and society.181 While it is 
generally agreed upon that corruption hinders democracy, explanations for corruption vary from 
country to country, and are in part based on the structure of the society and its values. Smith 
argues that corruption must be understood in the context of everyday instances of patronage as 
they occur in networks of kin, community, and interpersonal association. In his research on the 
Igbo people of Nigeria, Smith found that the very nature of personhood is grounded in 
relationships with family, kingroup, and community of origin. The motives of individual actors 
are inextricably tied to the interests of the social groups to which they belong.182  
Similarly, Peru and South Korea are both characterized as collectivist societies. In 
collectivist societies people belong to ‘in groups’ that take care of them in exchange for loyalty. 
Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount, and overrides most other societal rules and 
regulations.183 In the case of Nigeria, people use their kinship ties to invoke moral obligation 
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from others, and thus as a means to navigate the country’s clientelistic political economy.184 The 
importance of kinship in collectivist societies could help explain the popularity of Park Geun-hye 
and Keiko Fujimori in their respective countries, but it could also help explain why both 
politicians were found to be corrupt. In collectivist countries, the kinship ties Park and Keiko 
possess could be seen as a positive attribute because of the importance of family and the ‘in 
group.’   
Interestingly enough, Alexandru Roman and Hugh Miller argue that social status and 
kinship responsibilities should also be considered possible precursors to corruption. Corruption is 
often thought to be motivated by financial interests and material gain, but their research of 
corruption in Moldova emphasized the importance of nonmonetary rewards, such as bargaining, 
personal favors and gift giving, and how these acts are a part of everyday social life in Eastern 
European cultures. They stated that there is a thin line between relational practices and corrupt 
acts. In their case studies they found that often kinship associations trump financial interests in 
fostering corruption. Another theme they found in their research was that officials tended to 
think that there was nothing wrong with what they did because everyone does it or expects it. An 
expectation of corruption is attached to the position.185 This claim brings into question whether 
the case studies in South Korea and Peru were prone to corrupt tendencies because they were the 
kin of corrupt politicians, or whether they were corrupt as a result of an expectation and history 
of corruption in their roles as president or congresswoman.  
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Additionally, officials interviewed for Roman and Miller’s research believed that they 
were helping to move things along in a slow bureaucratic system.186 This thought process relates 
back to the original ideologies of Park Chung-hee and Alberto Fujimori. Both leaders believed 
that democracy could be paused in the name of progress. Park halted certain civil liberties and 
exploited labor to grow South Korea’s democracy, and Fujimori organized illegal death squads 
and judicial systems to stop the terrorist group The Shining Path. Although there may be several 
explanations for why corruption happens in certain societies, and it can be based off something 
seemingly harmless such as family values, corruption still has a negative impact on countries. 
Even if Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori were more likely to be corrupt, either because their 
fathers were corrupt or because they came into positions which are historically corrupt, this does 
not change the fact that their crimes, described in the next sections, were a hindrance to 
democracy.  
 
5.2 Park’s Crimes and Impeachment 
During her time as president Park Geun-hye failed in several regards, namely in that she 
rarely publicly addressed the country and that she was a central figure in the corruption she 
promised to eradicate. Most notably, the SEWOL ferry tragedy on April 17, 2014 stained the rest 
of her presidency. A passenger ferry carrying over 300 people, most of them high school 
students on a field trip, sank off the southwest coast of Korea. 304 people were missing or dead, 
and most of the crew survived. Investigation revealed that the incident was caused by negligence 
of the coast guard and crew, and the Captain and chief engineer were charged with murder.187 
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The tragedy had many political implications as well, as Park Geun-hye was absent while the 
events were unfolding in what is known as her “seven missing hours.” Since then, parents 
protested at the presidential Blue House and a semi-permanent camp of friends and families 
gathered in Seoul's Gwanghwamun Square, criticizing the government and commemorating the 
victims of the disaster. That week Park’s approval rating fell from a high of 71% to the 40% 
range for the first time in a year.188 Her seven-hour absence during the ferry disaster was the one 
of the primary reasons why Koreans lost trust in her, it was a failure of the country’s crises 
management system. During her impeachment hearings, Park’s administration submitted 
documents of her agenda for April 17th, the day the ferry sank, but the court dismissed it as 
“insufficient” and a “tactic to delay court proceedings.”189  
The primary reason for Park Geun-hye’s impeachment, along with the ferry tragedy, was 
her involvement in corruption with the chaebol conglomerate. Even before Park’s presidency, 
South Korea struggled with problems of collusion and bribery within their government and top 
industries. In February 2007, Chung Mong-koo, chairman of Hyundai and son of the company’s 
founder, was convicted of embezzlement and breach of fiduciary duty. He was pardoned two 
years later.190 After Park was elected as president in 2012, chairman Choi Tae-won of the SK 
Group, the third largest conglomerate, was found guilty of embezzlement of over $40 million 
from SK companies to cover up trading losses and was sentenced to 4 years in prison. In 2015 
the SK Corporation was accused of donating a total of 11.1 billion Won to slush funds for then 
President Park Geun-hye to pardon Choi, as well as illegal lobbying to win a license for a 
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lucrative duty-free business.191 In 2016 Lotte's 94-year-old founder Shin Kyuk-ho and his three 
oldest children were indicted on charges of embezzlement, fraud, tax evasion, and breach of 
trust.192  
The most significant of these allegations, though, come from the Samsung group. In 
August of 2017 Lee Jae-yong, heir to the Samsung empire, was sentenced to five years in prison 
for bribery. He was found guilty of bribing Park Geun-Hye in exchange for government support 
for a merger between Cheil Industries, the group’s de facto holding company, and Samsung 
C&T, the country’s biggest construction firm, that helped Lee tighten control over Samsung.193 
The court also found Lee guilty of perjury, concealing criminal profits, embezzlement and hiding 
assets overseas. Samsung was the biggest donor to a foundation set up by President Park Geun-
hye’s confidante Choi Soon-sil, donating over 43 billion Won in return for government support 
for the merger in 2015. Prosecutors also suspect that Samsung funneled a further 2.8 million 
Won to Choi through Widec Sports, a German company she used to buy horses and equestrian 
lessons for her daughter.194   
Park’s bribery scandal led the Korean people to call for the impeachment of their 
president. On March 10th, 2017, Park became the first South Korean president removed from 
office through parliamentary impeachment after the Constitutional Court upheld the National 
Assembly’s decision. The court determined that she was guilty of conspiracy, abuse of authority 
in the appointment of government officials, failure to protect citizens’ lives, violation of press 
freedom, receiving bribes, and extortion in conjunction with Choi Soon-sil. Three-quarters of 
South Koreans approved of the impeachment of Park after she was elected to office in her 
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father’s footsteps in 2012 with 51.6% of the vote.195 Over a year later on April 6th, 2018 Park 
was sentenced to 25 years in prison by the Seoul Central District Court for multiple counts of 
abuse of power, bribery and coercion, primarily citing the collusive ties between Park and 
Samsung. She was additionally fined $17 million. The judge stated that a tough sentence was 
needed to send a firm message to the country's future leaders.196 It seems that Park also took after 
her father in his close relationship between politics and business, as well as his disregard for the 
Korean people.  
 
5.3 Keiko’s Arrest  
 Although Keiko Fujimori was never elected president, she is still marred by scandal 
within her party and as a congresswoman. On October 31, 2018 Keiko was sentenced to three 
years in prison while she awaits trial for corruption. She was accused of taking $1.2 million in 
bribes from the Brazilian construction firm Obrecht during her campaign in 2011. Several other 
Latin American leaders have been charged with or found guilty of taking money from Obredecht 
to finance their campaigns in exchange for guaranteed building contracts. The construction giant 
has built venues for the 2016 Olympics and 2014 World Cup in Brazil, as well as metro systems, 
airports, dams, and motorways in other countries.197 Although Keiko denied the accusations, the 
judge affirmed that she had been organizing money laundering within her party, Fuerza 
Popular.198 Despite her denials, a poll revealed that 77% of Peruvians believe that she is not 
innocent199 and more than 70% are in favor of the judge’s decision to keep her in jail while 
                                               
195 “South Korea's President Is Impeached.” The Economist (16 Mar. 2017). 
196 Paula Hancocks and Yoonjung Seo. “Former South Korean President Park Sentenced to 24 Years in Prison.” 
CNN (6 Apr. 2018). 
197 “Odebrecht Case: Politicians Worldwide Suspected in Bribery Scandal.” BBC (15 Dec. 2017). 
198 Dan Collyns. “Keiko Fujimori, Peru's Opposition Leader, Sent Back to Jail Ahead of Corruption Trial.” The 
Guardian (31 Oct. 2018). 
199 “El 77% De Peruanos No Cree En La Inocencia De Keiko Fujimori.” El Telégrafo (26 Oct. 2018). 
 77 
awaiting trial.200 Her approval rating subsequently dropped to 11%201 and Peru’s congress, where 
Fuerza Popular holds a majority, has fallen to 12% approval rating.202  
In addition to these formal charges, Keiko has been linked to the cuellos blancos, a group 
of corrupt judges and prosecutors led by supreme court judge César Hinostroza, who fled to 
Spain in September 2018.203 A leaked online chat also revealed members and lawmakers of her 
party insulting the current president Matín Vizcarra and plotting to intimidate José Domingo 
Pérez, the prosecutor investigating Keiko.204 During her presidential runoff campaign in 2016 
Keiko lost Fuerza Popular’s general secretary and principal financer to an investigation by the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Joaquín Ramírez, a former bus-fare collector, 
was caught admitting to laundering $15 million for Keiko during her failed 2011 presidential 
campaign. Although the DEA stated that Keiko was not under investigation for the same crime, 
Ramírez was one of Keiko’s closest confidants and friends.205 Ramírez also faces a separate 
investigation by Peruvian prosecutors over a business empire. His resignation from the campaign 
came three weeks before the final election which Keiko lost.206  
All of this comes amidst her father’s own legal troubles. Alberto Fujimori, now 80 years-
old, was ordered back to prison by Peru’s Supreme Court in October 2018 just before Keiko was 
arrested.207 In 2009 Alberto Fujimori was sentenced to 25 years in prison for human rights 
abuses that included the killing of more than two dozen people by a military death squad that 
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prosecutors said the former president had created.208 In December 2017 President Pedro Pablo 
Kuczynski pardoned Fujimori on medical grounds, which came as a shock as he was a fervent 
critic of the Fujimoris while he was running against Keiko. Even though Kuczynski was not an 
ally of the Fujimoris, he was facing an impeachment threat led by Keiko in congress.209 Kenji 
Fujimori, Keiko’s brother who also served in congress, had himself and his supporters abstain 
from the impeachment vote, which Kuczynski survived. Days later Kuczynski pardoned Alberto 
Fujimori and he was released from prison.210 In June 2018 Kenji was suspended from congress 
over allegations that he bought votes to keep Kuczynski from being impeached. Kuczynski 
resigned in March 2018.211 Keiko and Kenji Fujimori disagree on how their father’s case has 
been handled.  
During her 2016 campaign Keiko vowed to not pardon her father, but still stated that he 
was innocent and should be released without government intervention. During a televised debate 
in April 2016 Keiko signed a “Commitment of Honor” which included statements on respect for 
democracy and human rights, respect for the press and freedom of expression, and a statement 
that she would not use political power to benefit family members. She also promised to expand 
reparations to victims of the government’s conflict with the Shining Path and women who were 
victims of her father’s forced sterilizations program.212 Kenji, as demonstrated by the accusations 
of buying votes, has stayed more loyal to their father and has relied on their father’s old guard to 
stay relevant.  
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The pardon sparked outcry in Peru and from the international community. Thousands of 
Peruvians took to the streets of Lima after Kuczynski’s decision was announced. The police used 
tear gas to disperse demonstrators who tried to march on President Kuczynski’s home. People, 
including many relatives of victims, marched holding pictures of those lost to the guerrilla 
conflict under Fujimori’s rule.213 The pardon was also met with several resignations from 
Kuczynski’s administration, including members of Congress, cabinet members, and other senior 
civil servants.214 The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner also 
released a statement condemning the decision, stating that “the presidential pardon granted to 
Alberto Fujimori on politically motivated grounds undermines the work of the Peruvian judiciary 
and the international community,” and that is was “a slap in the face for the victims and 
witnesses whose tireless commitment brought him to justice.”215 Keiko Fujimori, although 
publicly distanced herself from her family, still demonstrates how kinship and corruption helped 
her climb up the political ladder.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 In the case studies of Park Geun-hye and Keiko Fujimori both women came from 
political families and both women committed crimes of bribery. I do not claim that kinship ties 
cause corruption, but these two case studies add to a separate conversation about the role of 
political families in democratic countries. Kinship allowed Park and Keiko to have political 
careers, although they both ended up acting undemocratically. These are just two case studies, 
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though, and does not mean that the kin of former politicians should never be elected. As 
demonstrated by this thesis, kinship ties benefit women in beginning their political careers. As 
wives or daughters of former politicians they assume unofficial roles, such as First Lady, that can 
help build their experience and credibility, and give them name recognition. This advantage 
comes irrespective of whether the former political figure, in this case their fathers, has an entirely 
positive or negative legacy, and also of whether the woman campaigns with a cohesive policy 
platform. In the case of Park Geun-hye especially, she was seen as an extension of her father’s 
government and leadership in a patriarchal society, making her a more popular candidate. 
Gender also affects a candidate’s popularity, as women have often been viewed as more 
trustworthy than their male counterparts. This perception of women could explain why daughters 
and wives of authoritarian leaders can still be popular politicians.  
 Nostalgia was also critical for the case studies of Park and Keiko. Both Park Chung-hee 
and Alberto Fujimori are credited with saving their countries from crises. Evidence of nostalgia 
for economic security and a sense of progress and improvement is apparent in Park’s case. 
Voters in South Korea equated that feeling with Park Chung-hee (a feeling that was heightened 
during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis) and believed 
that his daughter could recover this ideal. Although Keiko lost her presidential election, she is 
still a successful congresswoman and is popular among the same demographics her father was 
because she mimicked his campaign strategy to garner support.  
 When I started my research, I expected to answer the questions of whether Park and 
Keiko were qualified and successful politicians or not. Since then I have realized that the 
conversation is not so binary. There are different aspects to consider when discussing the 
relationship between kinship and gender politics, as well as the role of nostalgia. By studying the 
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campaigns of Park and Keiko, however, I have learned about the different ways in which 
candidates can walk the thin line of fraught legacies. While Park was able to capitalize on 
nostalgia, Keiko had to contend with the challenges her campaign faced as a result of her father’s 
current imprisonment. Instead, she highlighted his positive aspects through song and dance. Both 
women used implicit allusions to their father’s governments in their campaign videos, avoiding 
mentioning them directly, but including specific images and phrases to hark back to their fathers’ 
successes. The daughters wanted to remember the economic growth and the sense of security 
that was enjoyed under their fathers’ administrations, but neglected to mention the numerous 
malfeasances committed by them, namely the exploitation of labor, forced sterilization of 
indigenous women, unlawful killings of political opponents, rampant censorship of the media, 
and the halting of all other branches of government save for the executive branch. There is a 
dangerous disconnect between these memories. “Remembrance of things past,” as Marcel Proust 
writes in his magnum opus, In Search of Lost Time, “is not necessarily the remembrance of 
things as they were.”216  
 
 
                                               
216 Marcel Proust as cited in “Memory Lane Has a Three-Way Fork.” The Atlantic (2016). 
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